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PREFACE 
Privacy is an amorphous concept. It has not only 
a legal meaning, the subject of this study, but also socio-
logical and psychological meanings which are beyond our 
purview here. An individual "right" to privacy, or "right 
to be let alone," as it is often characterized, is an even 
more complex idea. It suggests a fundamental obligation of 
people to respect another's private thoughts and affairs. 
But a general "right to be let alone" must be separated 
from the more limited discussion which will follow of the 
United States citizen's right to privacy from governmental 
intrusion, as the Supreme Court has protected that right 
within the constitutional framework. The more general 
"right to be let alone" also includes those undesired 
intrusions into one's privacy by other citizens and the 
press which are protected in some instances through tort 
cause of action, as provided by state statutes and common 
law. Though an interesting and indeed complex area itself, 
the private law right "to be let alone" is severed from 
this study except as it necessarily must be dealt with 
briefly in the first chapter, where its effect on the intro-
duction of the privacy right into public law will be shown. 
Although this study of privacy will be restricted 
to the Supreme Court's protection of it against invasion by 
\ 
' I
... \ 
111· 
government, it is still a survey and analysis of rather large 
dimensions, for what the constitutional "right to privacy" 
has come to connote includes a congeriesofrights concerning 
beliefs, ideas, the home, the dignity of the individual, 
solitude in one's intimacies, autonomy in personal decision-
making, electronic eavesdropping into one's private conversa-
tions, and disclosure of personal information. This study 
will attempt through a traditional method of case analysis 
to determine the development of the Court's position on in-
dividual privacy rights by examining not only its decisions, 
but also the dicta and some dissenting opinions, which often-
times formed the basis of a later decision, and critical 
assessments made by Court observers. 
Analysis will begin with the origins of the privacy 
concept in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and will 
continue with the cases dealing with privacy through the 
mid-twentieth century. With the enunciation of a general 
"right to privacy" doctrine in Griswold v. Connecticut in 
19651 , the Court faced, as it does with all vague new doc-
trines, a torrent of litigation complaining of intrusions 
into all sorts of "privacy" areas. What the Court has said 
in cases since 1965 about privacy, its constitutional under-
pinnings, and the Griswold decision itself is the heart of 
this study. 
"Apart from a good deal of private and official hand-
wringing"2 about the threats of government snooping,. the other 
1 . 
391 u.s. 479. 
2Robert B. McKay, "The Right of Privacy: Emanations 
and Intimations," Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 259, 
'iv 
branches of the government have done little, if anything, 
to protect the privacy of the citizenry. Complaints which 
reached the Supreme Court were dealt with, at first, in 
light of the small amount of privacy doctrine available. 
Then, as new techniques were developed by the Court for pro-
tecting civil liberties and as government intrusions into 
private lives occurred more frequently, the Court progres-
sively reinterpreted its privacy standards. 
The central thesis of this study is that the Supreme 
Court, after a half-century of incrementally developing 
"zones" of privacy protection through the various guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights, has arrived at a distinct, inde-
pendent "right of privacy" with the potentiality of pro-
tecting privacy in a broad range of situations. The Court 
has, at least since its Griswold decision in 1965, been 
developing a substantive, due process right to privacy in 
the areas of marriage, family, conception, and abortion. 
Although the privacy right's perimeters have yet to be 
determined, its new "substantive" nature lends itself to the 
protection of a myriad of other liberties involving personal 
conduct. However, the Court has shown that the right to 
privacy cannot be absolute, but must be weighed against the 
subordinating interest of the state in invading individual 
and group privacy. In other words, the "right to privacy" 
has become a basic part of the theory that government is an 
institution of limited powers that must meet a heavy burden 
of justification when it interferes with the freedom of its 
citizens. 
v 
CHAPI1ER I 
ORIGINS OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The Concept of Privacy 
~r k" d' h f · h · t · · 1 i•an in s searc or privacy as anc1en or1g1ns. 
Indeed, zones of privacy can be found "marked off, hinted 
at, or groped for" from the first pages of the Bible to 
the writings of Socrates and Epictetus, Thomas More, Locke, 
and Emerson. 2 Privacy has been spoken of as one of the most 
"elementary needs of all humans"J and as "one of the truly 
profound values for a civilized society. 114 It has also 
been called a "fundamental tenet of the American value 
structure,"5 and an underlying theme of the Bill of Rights. 6 
1Adam C~rlyle Breckinridge, The Right to Privacy 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 
p. 2. See also the discussion of the origins of the privacy 
claim in Alan F. Westin, Privacv and Freedom (New York: Athe-
neum, 1967), chap. lJ. 
2Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philo-
sophical Prelude," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (Spring 
1966): 272. 
3navid H. Flaherty, Privac in Colonial New En land 
(Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1972, 
·p. 242. 
4Harry Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren 
and Brandeis Wrong?" Law and Contemporary Problems Jl (Spring 
1966)1 326. . 
5Robert B. McKay, "Self-Incrimination and the New Pri-
vacy," in The lCJ'.-;7_ SUD!"_'?~~-Q_o_y_r_:LF~view, ed: Philip 3, ~·:u!'lJ.nd 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 196~), p. 210. 
6see Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). . 
1 
2 
Furthermore, it is said that "some of the central meanings 
of democracy are embedded in protections of pri~acy. 117 
As the interest in privacy developed, various attempts 
were also made to define a "right" to privacy in sociological, 
psychological, and philosophical, as well as leeal, terms. 
"Autonomy," "secrecy," "solitude," "control over the communi-
cation of information about oneself, 118 and "the rightful claim 
of the individual to determine the extent to which he wishes 
to share of himself with others"9 are a few of the defini-
tions that have been advanced. Since the late nineteenth 
century, however, the term that has most often been used is 
simply "the right to be let alone. 1110 The "right to be let 
a1one" could be claimed against government when one acted 
publicly as well as when one acted privately. It was the 
claim-that there is an area that has not been given over to 
public control--a sphere that a man can carry with him into 
his home, his bedroom, his church, club, or organization, 
and in some respects, into the street. Even when public, 
it was part of the inner man. It was part of his "property" 
in the Lockean sense," the kind of property with respect to 
which its owner has delegated no power to the state."11 
7Alan P. Bates, "Privacy--A Useful Concept?" Social 
Forces 42 (May 1964): 429. --
8Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Athe-
neum, 1967), p. 7. 
9Breckinridge, The Right to Privacy, p. 1 .. 
10The phrase was first encountered in Thomas M. Cooley 
A Treatise on th!L_Law of Toyts, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Callaghan ' 
and Co., lSSS), p. 29, c.ccorji!1,; to -,'iilli3.m L . .?rosser, "..::ri--
vacy, n California Law Review 48 (August 1960): J84. 
11Ernest Van Den Haag, non Privacy," in Priva_gv: Year-
book of the American Societv for Political and ].,§.£9-_Lll:tilQ§.2.=_ 
phy, No. 13, eds: Roland Pennocl: and John W. Chapman (hew York: 
3 
It is difficult, and almost impossible, however, to 
determine precisely what the scope of an all-encompassing 
"right to be let alone" would be. There is either the danger 
of over-definition, by which privacy would include the entire 
range of human freedom, or the danger of under-definition by 
which the right to privacy would be limited to statutory 
and common law protections and to those zones of privacy that 
can be identified as explicitly within the Bill of Rights, 
primarily in the First Amendment. 12 Although the definition, 
much less the scope, of the right to privacy has yet to be 
determined by the Court, privacy has, nonetheless, been in-
volved in or referred to extensively in decisions of the Court 
for many decades. Aspects of privacy were protected when 
adjunct to or part of other values or areas explicitly pro-
tected by specific provisions of the Constitution. However, 
it was not until 1965 with Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, that the Court recognized the substantive quality of 
the privacy right and declared it constitutionally protectable 
through the "penumbras" of a number of "emanations" from the 
Bill of Rights. 13 Until that constitutional declaration 
in Griswold, privacy had been, if not a legal right, then a 
Atherton Press, 1971), p. 149. For further discussion of the 
sociological aspects of the privacy right, see Edward Shils, 
"Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes," Law and Contempo-
rary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 281. 
12william M. Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and Ameri-
can Ia.w," Law and Contemnorary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 255. 
To compare two very different determinations of the.scope of 
privacy protection, see William o. Douglas, The Right of the 
Peo1Jle (Garden City, N.':{,: Doubleda~r and Co., i95n), c'.~s.-:>. 2: 
anci S'.rlvia Snowiss, '"l'!1e Le:~ac 1/ of Justice ,:,lac}::" in ·i.':;:; ~'~7'2, 
Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B. Kurland (Chicago:-Universitv 
of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 219. ' 
13see below, p. J4. 
4 
cultural norm which "served the purpose of providing a rallying 
point for those concerned about the encroachments of mass so-. 
ciety on the individual" which began to occur in the late 
nineteenth century with the industrial and technological revo-
lutions.14 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
Constitution, statutes, and common law had provided effective 
protections for the privacy needs of the person, home, and 
communications. Lockean assumptions of individualism, pri-
vate property, and limited government which were ingrained 
in early American political thought and the Constitution, 
had helped protect privacy. The First Amendment was con-
sidered to protect "private sentiment," "private judgment,"15 
and_"freedom of communion," including the "liberty of silence," 
and to free associations from "the spy, the mouchard, the 
dilator, the informer, and the sycophant" of police govern-
ment. "16 
Privacy was traditionally afforded protection also 
through the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. 17 The Third 
Amendment's prohibition of the quartering of so·ldiers in one's 
home in time of peace without the owner's consent reveals the 
early Americans' determination to protect the private realm 
l4Clark c. Havighurst, "Foreword," Law and Contempo-
ra;ry Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 251-52. 
15Justice Joseph Story, Comme~taries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States, 2nd ed., J vols. (New York: DaCapo 
Press, 1933), J: 726-7, quoted in Alan F. Westin, "Science, Pri-
vacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's," part 
2: "Balancing the Conflicting Demands of Privacy, Disclosure, 
and Surveillance, "_9_g]~?C-io. I.a·:i Re·riew (;I) (rfoverr."oer 19('.S): ::.23;. 
16Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self Government 
(Phila.: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1859), pp. 89-90, quoted--rn:-
Westin, ibid., pp. 1233-34. 
17see appendix . 
5 
from government invasion. The Fourth Amendment, however, is 
the clearest expression of privacy protection since it recog-
nizes the necessity for security in persons, houses, and pos-
sessions from unreasonable government search and seizure. 
The Fourth Amendment states the traditional British concept 
of a man's home as his castle. The Fifth Amendment's pro-
tection against compelled self-incrimination was another bul-
wark for privacy in early American life. 
The Fifth Amendment was interpreted by the late-
nineteenth century to be linked so closely to the Fourth 
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures that the compelled production of evidentiary materials 
was considered to be the same as compelled self-incrimina-
tion. This virtual merger of constitutional guarantees was 
pronounced in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), a 
criminal case which involved the threatened forfeiture of a 
shipment of plate glass because of the owner's refusal to 
produce an invoice for inspection by government officials. 
In Boyd the Court said that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
run."almost into each other" and that the doctrines of those 
amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the govern-
ment and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the 
privacies of life."18 
In an earlier case, Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 
(1878), the Supreme Court had broadly interpreted what "ef-
fects" were protected by the Fourth Amendment by holding 
that the mails were to be protected from 'tlnwarranted govern-
18 116 u.s. 616, 630 (1886). 
6 
ment intrusions, 19 In dictum the Court said that "~1 he 
constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be 
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and 
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against in-
spection, wherever they may.be, 1120 
After the broad interpretations of the Fourth Amend-
ment given in Ex Parte Jackson and Boyd, the Court in Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), decided upon a means 
for enforcing the amendment's guarantees. It adopted the 
exclusionary rule which prohibited the admission in federal 
courts of illegally seized evidence. The decision further 
stressed the necessity of the safeguards of the Fourth Amend-
ment in order to protect the sanctity of one's home and effects: 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized 
and held and used in evidence against a citizen ac-
cused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against 
such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so 
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as 
well be stricken from the Constitution,21 
These criminal cases involving government search 
and seizure have been cited since the earliest protection 
of privacy was made available through such litigation, Be-
fore the technologicaJ. revolution, physical searches and 
seizures were "primitive" but primary t.echniques of government 
intrusion into person, home, and effects. 22 The technological 
19"Privacy after Griswold: Constitutional or Natural 
Law Right?" Northwestern University Law Review 60 (January-
February 1966): 813. 
20 . . 
. 96 U.S. 727, 73J, 
21 232 U.S. J9J, 393. 
22Burt Neuborne, "Privacy and Individual Freedom," in 
Uncle Sam is Watching You: Highlights from the Hearings of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Wash., D.C.: Pub-
lic Affairs Press, 1971), p. lJ. 
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innovations of the late nineteenth century, which accom-
panied the industrial revolution, though making_ possible 
much of the privacy Americans enjoy, also made possible 
new means for invading privacy. Following closely behind 
the inventions of the telephone, microphone and recorder, 
and instantaneous photography, were wiretapping, electronic 
eavesdropping, and surreptitious photography. Psychological 
and sociological research developed methods of testing per-
sonality, detecting lies, and accumulating information by 
numerous means. 
With the wide range of techniques becoming available 
for surveillance, information-gathering, and psychological 
studies, the major threats to privacy became the political, 
administrative and cultural institutions, including popular 
journalists, private police and investigators, private busi-
ness researchers, and psychological and sociological re-
searchers. The average American seemed to take the intrusions 
as a matter of course and did not complain. Glenn Negley, 
writing about the value that Americans have traditionally 
given to privacy, explains that it is "a historical common-
place that problems often await acknowledgment until circum-
stantial developments force them upon our attention.If Amer-
ica's failure to recognize privacy "as a factor pertinent 
to moral and political speculation" has made the inevitable 
confrontation "one of the most critical problems of con-
temporary political and legal analysis," Negley further says 
that the rapid change in our technolog:r and social st:ruc-
ture "forces us to recognize that the privacy which •.• has 
8 
apparently been casually presumed as an ingredient of moral 
action can no longer be presumed but must be specified. 1123 
In 1890, the increasingly intrusive press so enraged 
two young Boston attorneys that they specified the privacy 
to which they felt every citizen has a right. In an article 
in the Harvard Law Review espousing the view that man is en-
titled to "be let alone," Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis (later to be Justice Brandeis) wrote that "political, 
social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new 
rights, and the common law, in its. eternal youth, grows to 
meet the demands of society."24 They insisted that the courts 
had used the principle, but under other labels, for there 
was no common law recognition of the right of privacy. Even 
though legal authorities have differed on the value of a 
privacy tort, 25the Warren and Brandeis article appears to have 
been influential in.deciding cases concerning privacy rights 
23Glenn Negley, "Philosophical Views and the Value of 
Privacy," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 320. 
24samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis "The Right 
of Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (December 1890): 193. The 
article developed from their outrage over newspaper accounts 
of the personal affairs of Boston bluebloods, including Warren's 
family. 
25see Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American Law," 
p. 257. See also William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law 
Review 48 (August 1960): 383, who subdivides privacy in tort 
law into four categories·: (1) appropriation of another person's 
name or likeness for personal advantage; (2) intrusion upon a 
~erson's seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs; (3) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about a 
person; (4) publicity that places a person in a false light in 
the public eye. See also Edward J. Blaustein, "Privacy, Tort 
Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty 
and Unconstitutional as Well?" Texas Lavi Review 46 (April 196q): 
Gll, where the discussio~ ce~ters on the ··~ass publicatio~ to~t~ 
See also Harry Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law," p. 326, who 
said Warren and Brandeis gave birth to a "trivial" tort. 
9 
which.began appearing at the turn of the century. Since the 
"6 first legal recognitions of a right to privacy in tort law, 2 
the privacy right has been granted status of varying degrees 
throughout the states. Some have recognized it in common 
law while others have granted it statutory status. What-
ever the standing of the privacy claim in private law, 27 
important though it be, it will not be further discussed in 
this paper. It has been important, however, for the develop-
ment of a constitutionally recognized concept of privacy. 
It is doubtful whether privacy claims against the intrusions 
of government would ever have entered the courtroom, if they 
had not first been recognized and discussed in the private 
law sector. 28 
Fourth Amendment Privacv Protections 
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the 
term "right to privacy" or "right to be let alone" had been 
introduced into legal circles. About the same time, a pri-
vacy issue which has been of continuous focus throughout this 
26rn Schuvler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y. Supp, 787 (1891), 
the court recognized a right to privacy in a question of whether 
private citizens had a right to erect a statue of a locally 
prominent woman over her family's objections. In Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902), the court 
found that a right of privacy had been invaded when the plain-
tiff's photograph was used without her permission to sell 
flour. In Pavesich v ~ Nev-1 E land Life Insurance Co., 122 
Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905 , the court held that a victim of 
an invasion of pri vac;y could recover· damages. 
27rn.Ettore v. Philco Broadcasting Corp., 229 F 2d 481, 
48.5 {1956), Judge Biggs said, "The state of the law is still 
that of a haystack in a hurricane .... We read of the rLo;ht of 
..,....-r~--:r.,c'r o-f ~)"""/~~1· 0"' o-f' r, ........ o ...... ·~r;....,, ,.....l· l""":"'~·-'-s of' ·o..,,,.. 0 ".1c'1 0..(:1 f'r"\"·I-- ....,,.,c+-J...1--V<- .) I - -'-•l ""--'-' U - .!""- !_-- \...., ~ r~Hv I - • •-'- J J.. -'-'·•~"'-'-"'- '-'I 
of equitable servitude, of unfair competition, and there are 
even suggestions of unjust enrichment." Quoted in Breckinridge, 
The Right to Privacy, p. 127. 
28For further discussion of the private law of privacy, 
see Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American Law." 
10 
century, arose in a criminal case before the Supreme Court. 
The case was Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), 
which came before the Court as a direct result of the Eight-
eenth Amendment ratified in 1919 and the Volstead Act which 
Congress had passed to enforce it. The petitioner Olmstead, 
a rum runner, was convicted during Prohibition on evidence 
of conversations that federal agents had heard in the five 
months they tapped his phone. Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft, writing the opinion of the Court for a majority of 
five, said that the liberal construction of the Fourth Amend-
ment could not "justify enlargement of the language employed 
beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, 
~apers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and sei-
zure as to forbid hearing and sight. 1129 The Court refused to 
continue the liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
begun by Boyd and Weeks. Clinging to the concept of tangible, 
"propertied" privacy, the Court held that wiretapping was not 
a physical trespass in the technical sense and therefore was 
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Of the four dissenters, Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
contributed immeasurably to the constitutional doctrine of 
privacy. His words have been quoted in federal and state court 
opinions ever since he penned them. If the Brandeis view had 
prevailed, a broad right of privacy would have been firmly 
established in the Fourth Amendment. Justice Brandeis argued 
that the Fourth Amendment was traditionally a guarantee of 
a broad right of. privacy and that the Framers" •.. conferred, 
as against the Government, the right to be let alone ...... 3° 
29277 u.s. ·4J8, 465. 
JOibid., 478, 
11 
Furthermore, he said that new ways would be found to abuse 
individual rights, and so guarantees had to be -continually 
extended to protect these rights: 
But "time works changes, brings into existence 
new conditions and purposes." Subtler and more 
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become 
available to the government. Discovery and in-
vention have made it possible for the government, 
by means far more effective than stretching upon 
the rack to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet.31 
After the retreat of the privacy doctrine in Olm-
stead, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' privacy implications 
were virtually abandoned by the Court for several decades.3 2 
Olmstead remained the basis for legal wiretapping and elec-
tronic eavesdropping even after Congress inserted an am-
biguous provision, Section 605, into the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934. That section was designed to outlaw 
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by federal officers, 
·but when the question came before the Court in Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Court held that 
electronic eavesdropping by the means used here--a detecta-
phone placed against the petitioners' wall--was neither a 
"communication" nor an "interception" within the meaning of 
the Federal Communications Act. Furthermore, since there had 
been no "interception" of a telephone conversation before 
its destined place, but only an "overhearing" of the message, 
there had been no trespass, therefore, under the Olmstead rationale 
Through the fifties and early sixties the Court generally 
Jlibid .• 473. 
32Angela R. Holder, "01.d Wine in New Bottles? The Right 
of Privacy and Future School Prayer Cases," Journal of Church 
and State 12 (Spring 1970): 239. 
J.3 6 31 u.s. 129, lJJ. 
12 
f'ollowed the Olmstead-Goldman "trespass" doctrine and upheld 
the use of electronic devices to monitor conversations. In 
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), the Court in-
voked the "physical trespass" distinction and held that the 
petitioner had freely engaged in conversation with a federal 
agent and overruled his objection that his Fourth Amendment 
right of privacy had been invaded by the recording of his 
conversation and admission of it as evidence against him. 
In Lonez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), the Court 
upheld the use of a secret recording device by an Internal 
Revenue Service agent to obtain proof that he had been of-
f'ered a bribe by a delinquent taxpayer. However, Justice 
William J, Brennan's dissent, in which Justice William o. 
Douglas and Arthur J. Goldberg joined, gave one reason to 
believe that the Court might be "on the brink of a ruling 
defining a comprehensive, positive right of privacy from un-
reasonable surveillance:"34 
Olmstead's illiberal interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment as limited to the tangible fruits of ac-
tual trespass was a departure from the Court's pre-
vious decisions, notably Bovd, and a misreading of 
the history and purpose of the Amendment. Such a 
limitation cannot be squared with a meaningful right 
to inviolate personal liberty ..•• Specifically, the 
Court in the years since Olmstead has severed both 
supports for that decision's interpretation of the 
Fourth.Amendment. We have held that the fruits of 
electronic surveillance, though intangible, never-
theless are within the reach of the Amendment.35 
34westin, "Science, Privacy, and Freedom," part 2: 
"Balancing,"·p. 1248. Westin says that an ideal ruling would 
be one holding Olmstead no longer relevant, recognizing a 
constitutional richt of Dri V3.C'.' i:r_ the ?irst .\seY:d!:lent q;;.:l 
"libert~:" clauses a: -chG ~7 i::-:::--. and ::.·ourteentrc Ar.1endr:-.effi:S, 21d 
measuring government intrusions into privacy by the require-
· ments of due process. Ibid .. 
35373 u.s. 427, 459-60 (1963). 
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Further in his dissent, Justice Brennan suggested 
a new basis for the privacy right--the First Amendment: 
But freedom of speech is undermined where people 
fear to speak unconstrainedly in what they suppose 
to be the privacy of home and office ... , The right 
to privacy is the obverse of freedom of speech in 
another sense. The Court has lately recognized 
that the First Amendment freedoms may include the 
right, under certain circumstances to anonymity ..•. 
The passive and the quiet, equally with the active 
and the aggressive, are entitled to protection when 
engaged in the precious activity of expressing 
ideas or beliefs. Electronic surveillance destroys 
all 8-nonirmi ty and all privacy; it makes government 
privy to everything that goes on.36 
What Justice Brennan was referring to when he· said 
that the Court since Olmstead "has severed both supports 
fo~ that decision's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" 
were the two decisions in 1961 and 1963 that had somewhat 
weakened the Olmstead rationale. In Silverman v.· United 
States, J65 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court held that the use of 
a spike microphone constituted a trespass against which the 
Fourth Amendment's guarantees did apply. Then, in Wong Sun 
v. United States, 361 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court held that 
obtaining incriminating conversations by recording devices 
without a warrant was an illegal search and seizure. 
In protecting privacy in the traditional areas of 
search and seizure, that is, areas other than electronic sur-
veillance, the Court was slow to evolve stringent constitu-
tional standards. The rule excluding evidence illegally seized 
which was deve.loped in Weeks in 1914 as effective against the 
federal government was not applied against the states until 
1961 in I.~aDP v. Ohio, Jr)? U.S. 1~4J. ~Ianp overturned :,/olf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 ~1949), which had held that although 
J 6..;b.d. 
. .L ]. ~· 470-71. 
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"security of on~'s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police" was enforceable against the states through the 
due process clause, "the ways of enforcing such a basic right 
raise questions of a different order ... 37 Mapp, in overturning 
Wolf, held that "all evidence obtained by searches and sei-
zures ·in violation of the Constitution, is by that same author-
ity, inadmissible in a state court."38 
In the years between Wolf and ffapp, the Court encoun-
tered alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment's "unreasona-
bleness" provision. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), 
police officers had f orceably pumped the stomach of a prisoner 
and used the evidence to convict him of drug trafficking. Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter, who had written the Wolf opinion, also 
wrote this opinion. But without a mention of Wolf, he said 
that such coerced confessions were constitutionally excluded 
from state trials through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
"not only because of their unreliability ,,,"but because, even 
.if independently verifiable, they "offend the community's 
sense of fair play and decency."39 Furthermore, Frankfurter 
said the stomach pump proceedings "do more than offend some 
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism, This is 
conduct that shocks the conscience. 1140 ·Justices Hugo Black and 
William Douglas concurred in the decision, but insisted that 
the appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation had been clearly violated. Justice Douglas said that 
37 :338 U. S·. 25, 27-2° ( 191}9). 
38367 U.S. 64J, 655 (1961). 
39342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). 
40Ibid., 172. 
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"words taken from {!.n accused's] lips, capsules taken from 
his stomach, blood taken from his veins are all inadmissible 
without his consent .•• because of the command of the 0 0 I 
Fifth Amendment. 1141 
In another case involving Fourth Amendment rights 
before the Map~ decision, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 
(1954), the Court faced the problem of reconciling the diver-
gent implications of Wolf and Rochin. In Irvine, police il-
legally entered the Irvines' house, installed electronic sur-
veillance equipment, and from a nearby garage, recorded con-
versations, The police again illegally entered and ransacked 
the house and arrested the suspect. Nevertheless, the Court 
relied on Wolf to include evidence obtained. The Court said 
that Rochin had involved elements lacking in Irvine: an ille-
gal search of the defendant's person and coercion. 42 
The security of the home, person, and effects was set 
on a somewhat stronger base by the holding in Mapp. However, 
in other claims of Fourth Amendment privacy rights, the Court 
gave the government more latitude to determine what was a con-
stitutional search and seizure. The Court relaxed the warrant 
restrictions on federal searches and seizures when "incident 
t t,143 d h 'd ' '' 1 ' . "44 Al . o arres an w en evi ence was in p ain view. so, in 
an administrative inspection case, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 
360 (1959), the Court, despite the invasion of privacy alleged, 
upheld the health department's warrantless inspection of the 
41Ibid., 179. 
42347 u.s·. 12R, 133 (195~). 
43 See U.S. v. Rabinowitz, JJ9 U.S. 56 (1950) and 
Stoner v. California, J76 u.s. 43J (1964). 
44See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
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appellant's home for rodents because the inspector had sub-
stantial evidence from a search of the grounds. The majority 
opinion by Justice Frankfurter recognized a right to privacy 
but seemed to say that it could only be invoked against 
searches for criminal evidence, and not solely to protect 
one's privacy. Justice Douglas, with whom Chief Justice Earl 
Warren and Justices Black and Brennan joined, dissented: 
The Court said in Wolf ... that "the security of 
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the 
police--which is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment--is basic to a free society." Now that re-
sounding phrase is watered dovm to embrace only 
certain invasions of one's privacy.45 
In other cases involving the claim of inviolability 
of the body, as in Rochin, the Court generally balanced the 
privacy claim against the state's interests in health, pub-
lic safety, and morality. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 
432 (1957), where the results of a blood-alcohol test admini-
stered on an unconscious man were admitted in evidence for a 
manslaughter conviction, the Court upheld the admission of 
the evidence. It said that "as against the right of an indi-
vidual that his person be held inviolable .•. must be set 
the interests of society .... 046 Justice Black joined with 
Justice Douglas in the following dissent: 
But the sanctity of the person is equally violated 
and his body assaulted where the prisoner is in-
capable of offering resistance .... Nor would I 
draw a line between involuntary extraction of words 
from his lips, the involuntary extraction of the 
contents of his stomach, and the involuntary ex-
traction of fluids of his body when the evidence 
obtained is used to convict him ••.. The indignity 
to the illdividual is the same in one case as in the 
othar ..• 7 . 
4 5359 u.s. 360, 375 (;959). 
46352 u.s. 432, 439 (1957). 
47Ibid;, 4J2, 443-44. 
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By the beginning of the early sixties, it was un-
clear whether the Court had determined "inviolability of 
the body" to be a privacy right protectable through the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Rochin had declared that 
forced stomach pumping was "conduct that shocks the conscience" 
whereas Breithaupt permitted a blood-alcohol test without 
consent. Two cases reaching the Supreme Court in 1964 were 
inconclusive with respect to fashioning a right to privacy, 
but were significant indications of increasing litigation 
in this constitutional area. In Schlagenpauf v. Holder, 379 
U.S. 104 (1964), the petitioner alleged an unconstitutional 
invasion of the privacy of his body since good cause was not 
shown for the lower court's requiring multiple medical exami-
nations to be performed on his person. The Court did not 
rule on the privacy question, but did vacate the judgment 
Of the lower court. However, Justice Douglas, dissenting 
in part, would deny at any time a compulsory medical exam 
upon the defendant in a damage suit. He said that .. [rU either 
the Court nor Congress .•• has determined that any person 
whose physical or mental condition is brought into question 
during some lawsuit must surrender his right to keep his per-
son inviolate. 1148 
In a second case in 1964, the Court denied certiorari. 
In York v. Story, .324 F. 2d 450 (9th cir. 196J), cert. denied 
376 U.S. 939 (1964), a federal court had held for the first 
time that a right of privacy through the "liberty" clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated by the state. 
48379 -u.s. 10~. 126. 
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York, a young woman brought a damage suit claiming an abridg-
ment of her civil rights when, after she had reported an 
assault on her person, police forced her to undress before 
them for photographs and then passed the photographs around 
the station. The lower court spoke of the privacy which was 
invaded in the following terms: 
We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of 
privacy than the naked body ..•. A sea~ch of one's 
home has been established to be an invasion of 
one's privacy against intrusion by the police, 
which, if "unreasonable," is arbitrary and there-
fore banned under the Fourth Amendment. We do not 
see how it can be argued that the searching of 
one's home deprives him of privacy, but the photo-
graphing of one's nude body, and the distr~bution 
of such photographs to strangers does not,49 
A1though finding that the photographing of the plaintiff's 
body had been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
lower court held that Fourth Amendment grounds could not 
dispose of the whole case, since the subsequent acts of 
po1ice in distr~buting prints of the photographs could not 
be characterized as unreasonable searches. Therefore, the 
court concluded that all the unlawful acts of the police 
"constituted an arbitrary intrusion upon the security of 
her privacy, as guaranteed to her by the Due Process Clause 
of' the Fourteenth AmendJnent, .. 50 
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were the starting 
point for the development of a right of privacy by the Court. 
However, the gains made by Silverman and Wong Sun in the area 
of electronic surveillance and by Mapp, Rochin, and York in 
areas of searches and seizures were meager when weighed against 
the gene~al permissiveness of the Court in electronic surveil-
49324 F. 2d 450, 455 (9th cir. 196J), 
50ibid,, 456. 
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lance, as evidenced by On Lee and Lopez; in the area of police 
searches and seizures, as evidenced by Irvine and Breithaupt; 
and in the area of administrative searches, as evidenced by 
Frank. 
First Amendment Privacy Protections 
Privacy was more effectively protected in the fif-
ties and early sixties by recognition of those privacy in-
terests implicit in the specific guarantees of the First 
Amendment, After the end of World War II, new specialists 
in intrusions were created with new arguments for their 
indispensability: the war itself, the Cold War, and national 
security.51 Their creation, however, also created the neces-
sity for protecting the individual's political privacy riehts 
! 
under the First Amendment. The Office of Strategic Ser-
vices, Military Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investiva-
tion, and Central Intelligence Agency carried on far-flung 
activities in surveillance and invasion of civilian pri-
vacy in order to acquire information and monitor the actions 
of Americans.52 The House Un-American Activities Committee 
and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security conducted 
extensive investigations into the lives of citizens considered 
"security risks" and forced the administrative branch of the 
federal government, as well as state governments and private 
51Justice Brandeis once wrote that we should "be 
most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's 
purposes are beneficient .••• " Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 
479 ( 1928). . 
52see Raiph ::ader, "In'·:.sion of t:i9 Hor.ie," in 1":-~"!..::; 
Sam Is Watching You, p. 2Jl, .for a review of the extension 
of the surveillance technologyinto the private sector. 
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employers, to institute "security checks" on employees, 
bringing into use personality testing and lie detecting. 
Though the i'ntensity of anxiety about "national 
security" declined in the sixties, the investigative, 
prying, and snooping routines of the government remained,53 
They remained for numerous reasons, but probably most of all 
because of the self-perpetuating way in which bureaucracy 
operates. Once a program has been started, the political 
and occupational interests keep it going. There is still a 
dangerous overtone to the surveillance of today. Govern-
ment agencies gather and assemble facts about millions of 
ordinary Americans into computers and make this information 
available to private organizations and businesses under less-
than-adequate safeguards. Americans hear that they "are 
rapidly entering the age of no privacy .• ,"and the next 
step in sophisticated snooping may be electronic snooping 
inside the brain "so that even our thoughts may be made 
available to anyone with curiosity and a sensitive machine. 11 54 
In popular novels written since the 1949 publication of George 
Orwell's 1..2.§!!, the citizen is urged to become more fearful 
53rt is impossible in a paper of limited scope such 
as this one to go into the electronic surveillance, data accu-
mulation, and other various means by which the government, 
uninvited, invades citizen's lives. See Nader, "Invasion of 
the Home," p. 231; Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Priv)cy 
. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1971 ; 
"A Secret Dossier on Every American?" U.S. News and World Re-
port __ 27 August 1973, p. 54; and Alan F. Westin and Michael 
A. Baker, eds., Databanks in a Free Societv: Comnuters, Record-
keeping, and Privacy, Report-Ofthe Project on Computer Science 
and En ineerin Board National Academ of Science (New York: 
Quadrangle 3ooks, 1972 . 
Sl' r~orris L. Ernst, The Great Reversals: Tales of the 
Supreme Court (New York: Weybright and Talley, 197J), p. 181. 
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of the threats that government intrusions pose for society.55 
In a not-so-humorous vein a law professor has predicted that 
bY: the year 2000, "someone will make a fortune merely by pro-
viding, on a monthly, weekly, daily, or even hourly basis, 
a room of one's own."56 
Thus it is apparent that First Amendment rights and 
closely related rights of privacy in ideas and actions "can-
not survive ..• unless the courts and public mores install a 
curtain of law and practice to replace the walls and doors 
that have been swept away by the new instruments of surveil-
lance. 1157 However, it has only been in recent years that the 
outrage of congressional committees and the press over the 
enormities of government intrusion has activated a new con-
cern for the protection of privacy. In other words, what 
Americans have considered to be as democratic as the secret 
ballot--the privacy of individual political ideas--has not 
always been protected by government. This freedom, as well 
as other facets of individual behavior--one's beliefs, emo-
tions, associations, reputation, and personal conduct--
was ·not defined by the Court until the mid-twentieth century. 
In the fifties the Court recognized the threat posed 
by government interrogation and prying into one's private 
ideas and associations and, in a series of cases, actively 
protected privacy rights through the First Amendment. In 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the right of associational 
· 55see Myron Brenton, The Privacv Invaders (New York: 
Coward-T.1cCann, 1964) and Vance Packard, ?he r.:2.Y:ed Societ·r ( ::e·.·1 
'.T k D . . .,,. c T ir: /Ir.) 
_or : . LC1 .. ay o. , _nc. , )'Yr- • 
.56Henry Kalven, "The Problems of Privacy in the Year 
2000," Daedalus 96 (Summer 196?): 832, quoted in McKay, "Self-
Incrimination and the New Privacy," p. 210 . 
.57westin, Privacy and Freedom, p. 398. 
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privacy was enunciated, In Watkins v. United States, J54 U.S. 
178 (1957), the· right of political privacy was identified, 
The right to anonymity in public expression was most ably pre-
sented in Tallev v, California, J62 U,S, 60 (1960), 
In NAACP individual privacy interests were being in-
vaded by Alabama's efforts to require the National Associa-
tion for the AdvancP.ment of Colored People (NAACP) to turn 
over its membership and officer lists, The Court found a 
"vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy 
in one's associations 11 58 and referred to that privacy as one 
of the fundamental freedoms protected by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a subsequent case filed 
against the NAACP, La. ex rel, Gremillion v, NAACP, 366 U.S. 
293 (1961), the Court held two state statutes unconstitutional 
which, as appi'ied to the NAACP, required the filing of the 
names and addresses of officers and members and affidavits 
testifying that· none of the officers of any group with which 
the NAACP was affiliated was subversive. 
In cases such as these the Court defended the privacy 
o:f association where the association was not subversive and 
not engaged in unlawful activities. This distinction was 
made by the Court in NAACP when it referred to its decision 
in N, Y, ex rel. Brvant v, Zimmerman, 278 U .s. 63 ( 1928), which 
had upheld the state's requirement that the Ku Klux Klan file 
58357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958), "Freedom to engage in as-
sociation," though not a specifically enumerated right in the 
Bill of Rights, was nonetheless held by the Court in· NAACP _~r, 
Alabama, 357 J,s,· 449, l+.]O, to '.Je "an insepar<:?..ble 3.spect oi'-
the 'liberty• assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. 0 
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the names of its members. That decision was based on the 
unlawful nature of Klan activities, The distinction was 
also made with reference to the case of Uphaus v. Wvman, 360 
U.S. 72 (1959), where the state's interest in obtaining the 
names of the guests at the World Fellowship camp, known to 
have Communist connections, outweighed the constitutional 
interests asserted by the appellant as to his associational 
privacy. Through such cases the Court made clear that pri-
vacy cannot be an unlimited right of associations "that 
seek undesirable social objectives whose methods of opera-
tion run afoul of reasonably applied conspiracy doctrines,"59 
The Court made certain also that the government clearly 
ascertained the unlawful or conspiratorial nature of associa-
tions. Thus, in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating 
Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), the Court reversed the con-
tempt conviction of the president of the Miami branch of the 
NAACP. The decision rested on the lack of sufficient evi-
dence by the legislature to prove a substantial connection 
between the Miami NAACP and Communist activities. 
Political privacy was also identified as an important 
adjunct to the freedoms of the First Amendment in Watkins. 
In that case, however, the right was not granted absolute 
status, but the Court said it would be protected in Congres-
sional committee hearings if "pertinency" was not satisfied. 60 
59Beaney, "The Rieht to Privacy and Americal'l. Law," 
p. 261. See also David Fellman, The Constitutional Right of 
Association (Chicago: University of Chica~o Press, 1963). 
\)Oin '.!atidns, thie Co~rt reversed the con·-riction of 2. 
labor union official who, before the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee, refused to answer questions about persons no 
longer in the Communist Party. 
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Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, said: "There 
is no general authority to expose the private affairs of indi-
viduals without justification in terms of the functions of 
the Congress. 1161 
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 2J4 (1957), 
the state equivalent of Watkins, the refusal of a guest lec-
turer at a state university to answer questions asked of him 
by a state official investigating alleged subversive activi-
ties had led to a conviction for contempt. Chief Justice 
Warren, who wrote the Court's opinion overturning the con-
viction, said, "We do not now conceive of any circumstance 
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights 
in these fields. 1162 The broadest statement of political pri-
vacy yet written by members of the Court, however, was Jus-
tice Frankfurter's concurring opinion: 
••• the inviolability of privacy belonging to a 
citizen's political loyalties has so overwhelming 
an importance to the well-being of our kind of so-
ciety that it can't be constitutionally encroached 
upon on the basis of so meager a countervailing 
interest of the state.6J 
Furthermore, he said that it was the Court's duty to balance 
"the right of a citizen to political privacy as protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the right of the state to self-
protection. 1164 
In protecting the right to anonymity in public ex-
pression in Talley, the Court found the right closely re-
lated to the right of associational privacy enuncia~ed in 
the NAACP cases. In Talley, a California ordinance requiring 
61 . J54 U.S. 173, 187 (1957). 
62354 U.S. 2J4, 251 (1957). 
63 . Ibid., 265. 
64
rbid .. 
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handbills to carry the names and addresses of sponsors 
was invalidated, The Court noted the important role that 
anonymous pamphlets and circulars had played in mankind's 
progress and held that the California ordinance "would 
tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and 
thereby freedom of expression."65 
These three First Amendment rights of privacy were 
substantially well established by the sixties, but they 
were, for the most part, political rights, and were still 
to be weighed against the "countervailing interest of the 
state." An area of contended First Amendment privacy that 
the Supreme Court did not protect during that decade was 
the so-called right of "solitude" or the right not to speak 
or be spoken to, such as the right of a traveler on public 
transportation to be free from imposed radio music and news. 
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), 
the Court reviewed a court of appeals decision that held 
that a constitutional right of privacy had been violated by 
the Washington, D.C., public utilities commission's imposi-
tion of radio news and music on the complainant. The Court 
balanced the privacy claim against the interests of the 
general convenience of passengers and found the latter in-
terest more substantial. Moreover, the Court held that the 
·commission had not violated any constitutional right of 
riders under the First Amendment or under the "liberty" 
concept of the Fifth Amendment. 
The fifties and early sixties did not see the blos-
soming of a· right to privacy since the Olmstead rationale 
65362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960), 
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remained (although some weakening of it occurred), the invio-
lability of the body was still not secured, administrative 
searches were upheld; and police were given even greater 
latitude in search and seizure procedures. However, the 
"spirit engendered"66 by the Court's activism in protecting 
First Amendment privacy rights during those years perhaps 
gave impetus to the.judicial formulation in 1965 of a 
general right of privacy. 
66
"Privacy after Griswold: Constitutional or Natural 
Law Right?u p. 819. 
CHAPTER II 
A UNITARY RIGHT OF PRIVACY ENUNCIATED 
Until Griswold v. Connecticut, 1 recognition by the 
Court of a right to privacy was either adjunct to a crimi-
nal action, especially when it could fit neatly into the 
search and seizure category, or it was expressed in terms 
of First Amendment guarantees of freedom of expression. 
Proponents of an independent doctrine of privacy foresaw 
the development of a broader interpretation within the con-
1 
cept of "liberty" through the due process clause of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, especially after a lower federal 
court had successfully used such an interpretation in the 
York case. 2 The chief proponent of this view was Justice 
William o. Douglas, one of the Court's strongest libertarians 
and most steadfast supporter of a right to privacy. 
Justice Douglas came on the Court in 1939. In 1942 
in Goldman, he adhered to the Olmst~_ad "trespass" doctrine, 
but by 1952, in On Lee v. U.S., he had had a change of heart, 
dissenting in·favor of the protection of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment. As discussed in Chapter I, Justice Douglas 
urged recognition of a right of privacy through the self-incrim-
ination clause of the Fifth Amendment in Rochin and in Irvine, 
1381 u.s. 479 (1965), 
2see b 19 20 a ove, pp. - . 
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and to some extent in Schlagenhauf. He also areued that the 
Wolf decision afforded protection of a Fourth Amendment right 
of privacy.3 In his 1958 book, The Right of the People, avowing 
his devotion to civil liberties, Douglas used words very simi-
lar to those he would use in the majority opinion in Griswoldz 
There is, indeed a congeries of ... rights that 
may conveniently be called the right to be let 
alone. They concern the rieht to privacy--some-
times explicit and sometimes implicit in the Con-
stitution. This right of privacy protects freedom 
or religion and freedom of conscience .•• the pri- 4 vacy of the home and the dignity of the individual. 
Justice Douglas expressed a belief that natural 
rights, explicit or implicit in the Constitution, were 
broadly based in morality and religionz "The penumbra of the 
Bill of Rights reflects human rights which, though not ex-
plicit, are implied from the very nature of man as a child of 
God."5 Although he stated that "every Fourth Amendment con-
test involves to a degree an issue of privacy,"6he did not 
choose that Amendment as his basis for the right to privacy, 
but concluded that due process includes those guarantees "irn-
plici t in the concept of ordered liberty" and outlaws prac-
tices "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."7 This con-
cern for those guarantees "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" led him to write in his dissent in Public Utili-
ties Commission v. Pollak8 that alone with privacy implications in 
Jsee Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Frank v. 
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 375 (1959). 
4William o. Douglas, The Right of the Peonle (Gar-
den City, N.Y.i Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1958), p. 87. 
5rbid., p. 89. 
6rbid., p. 149. 
7Palko v, Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 323, 325 (1937). 
8343 u.s. 451 (1952). 
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the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, there was also a 
guarantee of privacy within the "liberty" of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
Although Justice Douglas had a strong ally in Jus-
tice Hugo Black in defending civil liberties, including a 
broad interpretation of privacy through the First Amendment 
and the self-incrim~nation clause of the Fifth Amendment, he 
and Black separated with regard to the Fourth Amendment's 
right of privacy and to guarantees of privacy and other 
areas of "the right to be let alone"9 through substantive 
due process. Although they were both libertarians, it was 
Douglas' view that the Constitution was written to, in John 
Marshall's famous words, "be adapted to the various crises 
of human affairs," whereas Black opposed any such view, · ac-
knowledging his utter distaste for "judicial legislating." 
Black believed judges should seek the Framers' intent by 
examining the "literal meaning" of the words in the Constitu-
tion.10 It was this essential difference of opinion about the 
judicial function that was to emerge between these two jus-
tices in the Griswold decision. 
11 . In Poe v. Ullman, substantially the same case as 
Griswold, but which the Court did not decide for lack of jus-
ticiabili ty, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, again 
suggested that the substantive guarantee of "liberty" embodied 
9Douglas included within this right such freedoms as 
religion, travel, and silence, See Douglas, The Right of the 
People,. chap. 2. 
10see Tiri.sley E. ··r..:-":Jrou.csh, "Justices ~lc:.ck and 1Jo1_, -1-=-~::-: 
The Judicial ?unction c.ir!d -:he .Scope of Constitutional Liberties," 
Duke Law Journal (June 197J): 451. 
11367 u.s. 497 (1961). 
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a right to privacy: 
Though I believe that "due process" as used in the 
Fourteenth A~endment includes all of the first 
eight amendments, I do not think it is restricted 
and confined to them ...• "Liberty" is a conception 
that sometirr.es gains content from the emanations 
of other specific guarantees ... or from experi-
ence with the requirements of a free society.12 
Thus, when Griswold came before the Court in 1965, involving 
the same area of un~numerated "liberty," it seemed the opinion 
was already prepared in Douglas' mind. The only remaining 
task was to win a majority of the Court's support. 
Background of the Litigation 
It had not been an easy road that finally led op-
ponents of Connecticut's tough anti-birth control laws to a 
satisfactory Supreme Court decision, indeed to positive action 
in any form. Between 1917 and 1963, Planned Parenthood and 
other birth control groups had seen no less than twenty-nine 
bills for modification or repeal of the contraceptive laws 
die in the state legislature. Connecticut's contraceptive 
laws were known to be the strictest among the state versions 
of the federal Comstock Act of 1873. 13 The Connecticut statute 
' 
prohibiting use of contraceptive devices was enacted in 1879 
and, after revisions in 1888 and 1958 which added an accessory 
statute, the statutes at issue were the following: 
12Ibid., pp. 515-17. 
13Peter Smith, "The History and Failure of the Legal 
Battle Over 3irth Control," Cornell Law Quarterly 49 (Winter 
1964): 275. The federal Comstock Act stood until 1932 when the 
courts ruled it virtually nugatory. The Connecticut statute 
was·enacted under pressure from the Protestant community, as 
part of 2. ~e-:!eral r!0:!'.'2.l C.·2c·::::-.c·· '3.Ct. "'"n J_'J~~ -t":,e ::-7~at1x;;:c ·:'"'..S 
removed from the act and made a single statute with an acces-
sory clause to include those who assisted people in obtaining 
contraceptives. Ibid.-~ 
31 
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article 
or instrument for the purpose of preventing concep-
tion shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or 
imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than 
one year or be both fined and imprisonect.14 
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, 
hires or co:nmands aDother to commit any offense 
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the 
principal offender.15 
Since the legislative tactic seemed futile, in 
1935 the Birth Control League of Connecticut began the legal 
struggle by opening a birth control clinic which resulted 
in State v. Nelson1~nd Tileston v. Ullman!7in both of which 
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the consti-
tutionality of the statutes, holding them to be reasonable 
exercises of the state's police powers. The prosecution in 
both cases concerned the accessory statute. The Supreme 
Court denied appeal in Tileston on grounds that the plaintiff, 
d t h d t d . t t h' t' t ' . ht 18 a oc or, a no s an ing o asser is pa ien s rig s. 
A massive legal assault took place between May 19.58 
and I/!ay 19.59, in which nine persons brought action for declar-
atory judgment as to the constitutionality of the statutes. 
The case that reached the Court, Poe v. Ullman, 19 involved 
litigants under the fictitious names of Poe, Doe, and Hoe, 
who sought to establish their right to receive contraceptive 
information from their physician, Dr. Buxton, also a litigant. 20 
14section 53-32, General Statutes of Connecticut ( 1958 rev). 
15section 54-196, ibid .. 
16126 Conn. 412, 11 A. 2d 8.56 ( 1940). 
17129 Conn. 84, 26 A. 2d 582 (1942). 
1831() u.s. 1}4 (191J.3), Q2JY,.?~'l.L..9i§:-:-l;_~~ed. 
10 , . I ( ,- ) . . 
'Jo? U.S. 497 19ol , anneal d1s81ssed. 
2
°For information about the. other six persons who had 
brought action, see Smith, "Legal Battle over Birth Control," 
p. 219. 
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They contended that the statute prohibiting the use of con-
traceptives deprived them of life and liberty without due 
21 process of law. However, in the opinion of the Court, 
written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the history of general 
non-enforcement of the birth control statute and the remote 
likelihood of arrests under it, demonstrated that the case 
neither possessed the immediacy required nor was a true contro-
versy. Hence, the Court should not adjudicate any constitu-
tional question involved. Joining Justice Frankfurter in the 
opinion were Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Tom C. 
Clark, Charles E. Whittaker, and William J. Brennan. Of course, 
as mentioned earlier, Justice Douglas dissented, enunciating 
a marital privacy right which the Court would later accept: 
The regulation as applied in this case touches 
the relationship between man and wife: It reaches 
into the intimacies of the marriaee relationship ... 
when the State makes "use" a crime and applies the 
criminal sanction to man and wife, the State has 
entered the innermost sanction of the home. If it 
can make this law, it can enforce it. And proof 
of its violation necessarily involves an inquiry 
into the relations between man and wife. That is an 
invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free 
society. . . . This notion of privacy is not dravm from 
the blue. It emanates from the totality of the con-
stitutional scheme under which we live.22 
Justice John rn:. Harlan, in dissent, believed that the 
statute was "an intolerable and unjust~fiable invasion of pri-
vacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an indi-
vidual's. life "23 and found it unconstitutional on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds: 
.••• the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited bv 
22 367 u.s. 497, 519-21. 
23Ibid., 539. 
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the precise terms of the specific guarantees else-
where provided in the Constitution ...• It is a 
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, in-
cludes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints ... and 
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensi-
tive judgment must, that certain interests require 
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs 
asserted to justify their abridgment.24 
The Facts of Griswold 
In reaction to the Court's denial of appeal in Poe, 
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, in open de-
fiance of the law, made known that it would proceed to open 
birth control clinics. 25 With the -Opening of a clinic at 
New Haven, Estelle T. Griswold, Executive Director of the 
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Dr. Charles 
L, Buxton, physician, professor at Yale Medical School, 
and director of the New Haven Center, were arrested under 
the accessory statute. Litigation was initiated as State 
v. Griswold, State v. Buxton. After the statute was again 
upheld by the Connecticut Supreme Court, Griswold v. Con-
necticut came to the U.S. Supreme Court. Griswold and 3ux-
ton appealed to the Court on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, 
asserting that the offense with which they were charged--
_counseling and supplying contraceptives to married persons--
should not be made a crime by the state. The Court, however, 
24rbid., 541. Justice Stewart joined the dissents of 
Justices Douglas and Harlan. Justice Black dissented by 
saying that he believed the constitutional issue should be decided. 
25The League issued this statement upon the.Poe deci-
sion: "We welcome the recogr.ition by the Court that the law has 
in fact become a nulli t~r." L· ··. ":9~8.~9- ':'~i b;;;:e 21 Ju;:2 J. I")-< J_, 
quoted in Sraith, "I..e.::;al .=att]_e v_;c;: ~)i:::-~:1 Cont;:ol," p. 2.5. 
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instead of finding standing of appellants under the acces-
sory statute, found that they had "standing to .raise the con-. 
stitutional rights of the married people with whom they had 
a professional relationship,"26distinguishing the facts of 
standing and justiciability. of Tileston. 27 
The Court held that the Connecticut statute for-
bidding the use of contraceptives violated the right of mari-
tal privacy "lying within the zone of privacy created by · 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees."28 The divi-
sion of the Court at 7-2 would give one the impression, at 
first glance, of virtual unanimity in the new "penumbral 
right to privacy" theory. However, only Justice Tom Clark 
seemingly concurred fully in Justice Douglas' opinion, since 
he wrote no opinion. Justices John Harlan, Byron White, and 
Arthur Goldberg wrote distinctly separate opinions, with 
.Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan joining 
in Justice Goldberg's. The dissents also were not casual, 
for Justices Hugo Black and Potter Stewart each wrote lengthy 
dissents, each joining in the other's. 
The Opinion of the Court 
Given Justice Douglas' posture on the right to pri-
vacy as.inherent in the concept of "liberty," especially in 
his Poe.dissent four years earlier, one would have expected 
him to place the Griswold decision directly on the due pro-
cess clause.of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, he enun-
26391 u~s. 479, 4q1. 
27The Court was obviously using the standing issue 
in order to be able to consider the question of "use" of 
contraceptives and the broader right to marital privacy. 
28381 U.S. 479, 4S5. 
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ciated an implicit "right to privacy" based on a "penumbral" 
notion of constitutional rights. He had indeed spoken of 
"emanations of other specific euarantees" 29 prior to Griswold, 
but it had been tied to the concept of "liberty" within the 
due process clause. Now he· introduced a vague and uncer-
tain theory which proposed that "emanating" from the various 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights were various "zones of pri-
vacy," each of which ·would be given constitutional status. 
He defended this penumbral theory by pointine to tirr.es when 
the Court had defended other unwritten "penumbral" rights: 
The associ~tionof people is not mentioned in the 
Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. The right 
to educate a child in a school of the parents' 
choice--whether public or private or parochial--
is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study 
any particular subject or any foreign language. 
Yet the First Amendment has been construed to 
include certain of those rights.JO 
Justice Douglas mentioned Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
·Meyer v. Nebraska, and NAACP v. Alabama, as granting such peri-
pheral rights to individuals and said that "without those peri-
pheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. 11 31 
Guaranteeing the penumbral rights of privacy, he said, are 
various rights and the peripheral rights which emanate from them: 
The right of association contained in the penumbra 
of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The 
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the 
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of 
peace without the consent of the ovmer is another 
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment expli-, 
citly affirms the "right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause 
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which 
20 . /Poe v. Ullman, J~7 U.S. 497, 517 (19~1). 
3°381 u.s. 479, 482. 
Jlibid. , 483. 
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government may not force him to surrender to his 
detriment, The Ninth Amendment provides: "The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people.J2 
Thus the basis for the Court's ruling that the con-
traceptive statute of Connecticut was unconstitutional was 
the "penumbral" right to marital privacy created by various 
"emanations" from the specific guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights. The reason that Justice Douglas formulated this 
basis is discernible early in the opinion when he notes that 
the appellants urge their claim upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause: 
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner 
v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 1905 should be our euide. 
But we decline that invitation as we did in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, JOO U.S. 379 1947 - ••. 
(et al:) JJ 
Justice Douglas obviously shied away from the "invi-
tation" to reinvigorate the activist due process dogma of 
the Lochner era since the modern court's "hands off" stance 
would hardly allow it. In perhaps an effort to allay the 
Court's fears, he said: 
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine 
the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch 
economic problems, business affairs, or social 
conditions,J4 
Perhaps a reason for his formulating such a broad opinion 
was the hope of drawing together his dissident majority by 
eliminating the suggestion that the Court was attempting to 
encroach upon the state's powers to guard the healttt and 
32Ibid., 
Amendments. 
33rbid., 
34rbid., 
482. 
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morals of its citizens. Nevertheless, he shrewdly included 
some very able grounds for finding the statute unconstitu-
tional as an infringement of due process when he said: 
Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar 
principle, so often applied by this Court, that a 
governmental purpose to control or prevent activi-
ties constitutionally subject to state regulation 
may not be achieved by means which sweep unneces-
sarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro-
tected freedoms.35 
Differing Evaluations on the Court 
Indeed, the new fundamental right to privacy which 
arose from the "penumbras" of the Constitution seemed to 
attract some of the justices' attentions away from the spirit 
of substantive due process woven throughout the decision. 
Nevertheless, there was still sharp disagreement on the Court 
concerning the "totality of the Constitution" as the basis 
for the privacy right. Discussion centered on the determi-
nation of exactly what part of the Bill of Rights justified 
a new constitutional right broader than the traditional First, 
Fourth, or Fifth Amendment approaches. 
Justice Goldberg rejected any necessity for a "penum-
bral" theory and argued that the right was fundamental through 
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. First, he relied on 
the due process clause-which "protects those personal rights 
that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific 
terms of the Bill of Rights. 11 36 The Ninth, he said, reveals 
that the Framers 
·believed that there are additional fundamental 
rir;hts, rrotected fro;:i sc· 0 -:·-' ~ :- + ~ 1. in::~~. !:".'0r':e:nt' 
which exist alongside those fu~~~~en~al riGhts 
35rbid., 485. 
36rbid. , 486. 
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specifically mentioned in the first eieht 
Constitutional Amendments.J7 
To somewhat abate the arguments lodged by strict 
constructionists like Justice Black against such liberal 
interpretations of the Nintn and Fourteenth Amendments, 
Goldberg made these pointss 
(1) In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in 
light of their personal and private notions. Rather, 
they must look to the "traditions and (collective) 
conscience of our people" to determine whether a 
principle is "so rooted (there) ..• as to be ranked 
as fundamental." JR 
(2) (Dissenters] would permit experimentation by the 
States in the area of the fundamental personal riehts 
of citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution 
grants such power either to the states or to the 
Federal Government. J9 · 
(J) Finally, it should be said of the Court's 
holding today that it in no way interferes with a 
State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity 
or misconduct. 40 
Justice Harlan, who in his Poe dissent had referred 
to the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment as a "rational 
continuum,"41argued in a concurring opinion that 
the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is 
whether this ••• statute infringes the Due Process 
Clause ••• because the enactment violates basic values 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 1142 
Conceding a point to Justice Douglas' opinion, that "rele-
vant inquiry may be aided by resort to.one or more of the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights," he nevertheless concluded 
that "it is not dependent on them or on any of their revelations." 
37 I-bid •• 488. 
JSibid., 493. JC . /Ibid . . 
40Ibid. , 498. 
41367 u.s. 497, 543. 
42381 U.S. 479, 500. 
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Furthermore, " [t1he Due Process Clause 
own bottom."43 
• • • stands on its 
Justice White, in his concurrence, based the uncon-
stitutionality of the Connecticut statute on its "sweeping 
scope ••• with its telling effect on the freedoms of married 
persons" and on its unreasonableness to the state's stated 
purposes banning illicit sexual relationships. He, there-
fore, concluded that the statute "deprives such persons of 
liberty without due process of law." However, he stressed 
that the due process clause should not be used to invalidate 
statutes "if reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a 
legitimate and substantial state interest and not arbitrary 
. . . l' t. .,44 or capricious in app ica ion. 
As expected, the dissenters, Justices Black and 
Stewart, took offense with the natural law-fundamental law-
due process approach of the majority. First, however, Jus-
tice Black challenged the new "right to privacys" 
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of 
privacy" as though there is some constitutional 
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever 
to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" 
of individuals. But there is not. There are, 
of course, guarantees in certain specific consti-
tutional provisions which are designed in part 
to protect privacy at certain times and places 
with respect to certain activities. Such, for 
example, is the Fourth Amendment's guarantee 45 against "unreasonable searches and seizures." 
However, with regard to the Fourth Amendment's 
guarantee of privacy, he said: 
It belittles that amendment to talk about it as 
though it protects nothi Yl~ but "pri .. ,acv. " To 
43rbid •• 
44Ibid., 507; 
45Ibid., 509. 
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treat it that way is to give it a niggardly inter-
pretation, not the ldnd of liberal reading I think 
any Bill of Rights provision should be given.46 
Furthermore, he said.that the Court uses the term "right to 
privacy" as a "comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amend-
ment's guarantee against searches and seizures, 1147 As a 
strict constructionist, he viewed it as a term that "can 
easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also ,,, easily 
be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things 
other than searches and seizures •• ,4·3 Finally, concerning 
the overall decision of the Court, he said: 
I like my privacy c:.s well as the next one, but' 
I am nevertheless compelled to admit that govern-
ment has a right to invade it unless prohibited 
by some specific constitutional provision.49 
Concerning some of the justices' use of the due 
process clause and the Ninth Amendment as bases for finding 
the statute unconstitutional, Justice Black found the two 
to be the same thing--merely using different words 
to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary 
power t·o invalidate any legislative act which the 
judges find irrational, unreasonable, or offensive.50 
Concerning the Ninth Amendment especially, he said that use 
of "such broad, unbounded judicial authority would make of 
this Court's members a day-to-day consti tutiona.l convention, u5l 
Justice Black obviously drew the conclusion that the 
Court had in Griswold revived the due process clause "with 
an 'arbitrary and capricious' or 'shocking to the conscience' 
46rbid. , 509. 
47Ibid .. 
. 
48Ibid .. 
49Ibid., 5iO. 
50ibid. , 511. 
51Ibid., 520, 
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.formula," whereas he had hoped "that we had laid that formula, 
as a means for striking do\'m state legislation,. to rest once 
and for all ...... 52 
Justice Stewart, dissentine, believed the Connecticut 
statute to be "an uncommonly silly law," but agreed with Jus-
tice Black that "we are not asked in this case to say whether 
we think this law is unwise, or even asinine." He said, fur-
thermore, that "we are asked to hold that it violates the 
United States Constitution. And that I cannot do."53 
Justice Stewart particularly attacl::ed the Ninth Amend-
ment approach of Justice Goldberg, saying that it "turn [s] 
somersaults with history ... 54 He felt rather that the Ninth, 
like the Tenth Amendment, was 
framed ... and adopted .•. simply to make clear 
that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not 
alter the plan, that the Federal Government was 
to be a government of express and limited po\'/ers, 
and that all rights and powers not delegated to 
it were retained by the people and the individual 
States~55 
Although the seven justices in the majority disa-
greed on the specific underpinnings of claims of right to 
privacy, they did agree that the contraceptive statute had 
invaded an area considered to be fundamentally and inti-
mately private--the relationship of husband and wife, 
Whether a value "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 
or an "emanation" of the penumbral right of association of the 
52Ibid., 522 . 
. 53rbid. , 527. 
54Ibid. , 529. 
55Ibid., 530. 
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First Amendment as Justice Douglas urged,56the right to 
marital privacy is a constitutional right. 
However, unlike some rights which the Court holds 
"absolute," especially those guaranteed in the First Amend-
ment, the new right to marital privacy was qualified in 
several majority opinions so as not to be interpreted too 
broadly or absolutely. Justice Goldberg had said that it 
would not interfere "with a state's proper regulation of 
sexual promiscuity or misconduct"57and that "the State may 
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which 
is compelling. 11 58 Justice White had made it clear that 
states could enact statutes "reasonably necessary for the 
effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest 
and not arbitrary or capricious in application."59 
Reaction to Griswold 
While the facts of the case dealt only with those 
limited to marital privacy, its reasoning was certainly 
intended to be applicable to many other unspecified situa-
tions. It was this fact of broadness and ambiguity, along 
with the shaky basis of the new right to privacy, with no 
specific provision of the Constitution to sustain it, that 
caused a general feeling of skepticism among legal analysts. 
56"Marriage is a coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of 
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; 
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet 
it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved 
0 
• d . . " Tb. d 4R5 1n our prior ec1s1ons. _ i ., , • 
57rbid., 498. 
5Sibid. , 497 •. 
59Ibid., 507. 
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As if these considerations did not make the pronouncement 
of a unitary right to privacy novel enough, it could also 
be noted that the decision ignored the technical "trespass" 
requirements which had guided the Court when confronted 
with.Fourth Amendment claims to privacy. Since there had 
been no police entry into the bedroom of the appellants or 
those married couples for whom they sought relief, no "tres-
pass" argument could be substantiated. 60 The Court had 
divorced its decision, therefore, from the "preferred posi-
tion" given to "propertied privacy" in criminal prosecu-
tions and from the traditional declaration of a privacy 
right only within a specified provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Philosophical Criticism 
In primarily a philosophical disagreement with the 
Court, Ernest Van Den Haag called the Court's opinion "an 
elaborate 'jeu de mots' in which different senses of the 
word 'privacy' were punned upon and the legal concept gen-
erally mismanaged in ways too various to recount." Van Den 
Haag felt that rather than "privacy," the issue was "auto-
nomy" since the government was attempting to "regulate" per-
sonal affairs, not "get acquainted" with them. He sympa-
thized with the conceptual difficulties "if the confusion 
was inadvertent," but "if deliberate, admired the Court's 
ingenuity!" Van Den Haag criticized the Court, however, 
for having "muddled the separate issues" of "privacy" and 
60 Al thou-;h Just ice '.Jou_r::las, :":a;:eu·1e ri;;.e: to find as 
many grounds as possible fa:::" "the right to privacy, asked 
the moot question: "Would we allow the police to search the 
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of 
the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the 
notions c.r nrivacy surrounding the marriage relationship." 
Ibid. , 485-6. · 
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"autonomy" and suggested that conventional grounds should 
have been used for the decision, such as arbitrary interfer-
ence with personal liberty in contravention of the due pro-
cess clause or even an endeavor to establish a particular 
religious tenet in violatioh of the First Amendment. 61 
In agreement with Van Den Haag's philosophical argu-
ment was Hyman Gross who regarded the Griswold opinion as un-
satisfactory as the decision was reached by "punning" on the 
privacy concept. He felt as did Van Den Haag that Griswold 
only contributed to the "conceptual muddle" around privacy. 62 
Robert Dixon found the case "longer on yearning than 
ort substantive content" and saw the concept of intrinsic pri-
vacy becoming so blurred in judicial usage as to make its 
"reasoned evolution ... quite difficult, if not impossible." 
Dixon felt that in order to narrow the field of privacy from 
the general "laissez faire" policy of a general freedom of 
action, the Court should think of "right to privacy" in terms 
of limits upon government's powers to force exposure, thus 
involving personal secrecy in conduct and ideas, plus the 
factor of solitude, involving freedom from certain social 
impositions and pressures. Dixon saw an additional dimension 
in Griswold of neither secrecy nor solitude, but a "right to 
access to information relevant to the specific condition of 
privacy·at issue." Thus, he said that Griswold, by adding 
61Ernest Van Den Haag, "On Privacy," in Pri V.EC'': 
Yearbook of the American Societv for Political and leg§l.l 
Philosonhv, No. 13, ed: Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman 
(New York: Atherton Press, 1971), pp. l~0-1, 1R7, 
"? . 0
-:-:yman Gross, ":he Concept of ?!'.'i vac~/, " :·iew ·,'o:-:: 
University Law Review 42 (:/arch 1967): 35. 
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this dimension, did little to clarify privacy's conceptual 
dimensions. Furthermore, the Griswo).g opinion,. he said, 
provides varied and flexible underpinnings to fit 
those situations that don't fit into established 
categories neatly but still seem to rest on values 
thought to be vital and which, for lack of a better 
term, are called pr'ivacy.6J 
Cr1 ticism of Appellants' Standine;: 
The first issue which critics challenged aside from 
the use of the "privacy" concept itself was Justice Douglas' 
broad approach to standing, allowing the defendant clinic 
supervisors to raise the rights of married couples not be-
fore the Court. This approach in itself raised the privacy 
question, for it submerged the question of whether the state 
had the power to regulate birth control clinics or whether 
the regulatory legislation was a reasonable means to accom-
plish the state's purpose of discouraging sexual promis-
·cuity. These basic and difficult questions were virtually 
glossed over by the Court's rush to get into the business of 
privacy. (Noteworthy is the fact that the attorneys for the 
appellants indicated in their briefs that the bases of the 
appeal were a due process test of whether the statute was a 
reasonable means to achieve a proper legislative purpose, and 
a First Amendment test of whether the statute also violated 
appellants' freedom of expression to disseminate information 
and advise their patients. 64 ) 
Robert Dixon had this to say about the decision on 
appellants' standing: 
6J . Robert G. Dixon, Jr., "The Griswold ?enumbra: Con-
stitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?".Michigan 
Law Review 64 (December 1965)~ 197, 204-5. 
64Ibid., p. 215. 
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Suffice it to say for the present that unless 
some kind of information-access theory is recog-
nized as implicit in Griswold, then it stands as 
a decision without a satisfying rationale. At 
least it will stand thus except for those who can join the Court in using the ploy of "standine" to 
remake the actual birth-control-clinic situation 
into a marital-use-of-contraceptives situation.65 
The "standing" issue was important to the manner in 
which Justice Douglas arrived at the conclusion that the pri-
vacy of marriage had been invaded. Robert Dixon, continuing 
with his line of criticism, thus said: 
With the issue thus remade, we have a modern mo-
rality play, with much judicial fingershaking at 
fictional police invading a fictional bedchamber 
of a fictional couple in search of evidence of the 
use of contraceptives, The actual result of Gris-
~gld may be applauded, but to reach this result, 
was it necessary to play charades with the Con-
stitution?66 
Constitutional Underpinnings 
There seems to be a common assumption among a good 
number of those who reviewed Griswold that although the enun-
ciation of a unitary right to privacy was novel, the theory 
behind it was not, It was compared to the natural rights 
theory which had been used to find police procedures un-
constitutional abridgments of the basic rights of human 
dignity as in Rochin where police procedures were weighed 
on the scales of "conduct that shocks the conscience . . . 
which offends the community's sense of fair play and de-
cency, "67 Also, Griswold's enunciation of a right to privacy 
was theoretically the same as the idea that we have certain 
basic riehts "implicit in the conceut of ordered li bert'r" 
(1952). 
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which had been expressed in Palko, ~!apo, Irvine, and Rochin. 68 
.One analyst of the Griswold opinion said that 
the Court has no need to search for an identifi-
able, traditional "right to privacy" to justify 
the decision (since the Connecticut statute was 
simply inconsistent. with the concept of reasona-
ble liberty) .•. which due process of law has come 
to connote for us and which we must let our nine justices apply.69 
For these same reasons, yet another Court observer said, 
"th t t th .,7o e cases a es no new eory •... 
There was also opposition to the focus of five jus-
tices on the Ninth Amendment.71 Those already opposed to 
the breadth and multiplicity of the zones of privacy sug-
gested by Justice Douglas felt that the focus on the Ninth 
did not help to narrow those zones: "Mr. Goldberg's ap-
proach, in short, does not offer assistance in defining 
privacy, but is at least congenial to further probing and 
experimentation." 72 
At least two Court observers were generally pleased 
68Angela R. Holder, "Old Wine in New Bottles? The 
Right to Privacy and Future School Prayer Cases," Journal 
of Church and State 12 (Spring 1970): 302. 
69Robert B. McKay, "The Right of Privacy: Emana-
tions and Intimations," Michigan Law Review 64 (December 19665): 
277. 288. 
70Paul G. Kauper, "Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, 
Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case," 
Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 251. 
71r.1any Court observers were surprised when five jus-
tices accepted the invitation to consider the Ninth Amend-
ment. Justice Douglas included it among the enumerated rights 
from which the "penumbral" right to privacy could be deri.i.re-1, 
with Justice Clark concurring. Justices concurring with Gold-
berg's more extensive reliance on the Ninth were Warren and 
Brennan. See Thomas I. Emerson, "Nine Justices in Search of 
a Doctrl. ne II ~.7i ch~ ,....,,n T "'VT ::i .-,~·i c.··r /--L~ ( ;:,-,co .... ·her ior)5). ?l <; .. , .. -- .... --..,·-· ...._ ___ ... ~~--·--· ... ,-----~''""" /'- . ..__._,,. 
72Dixon, "The Griswold Penumbra, 11 p. 207. 
/ 
48 
with the Court's efforts in Griswold. William M. Beaney in 
1962 had urged that the Court "work out a right· to privacy 
based on the 'liberty' concept in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments" or provisions of the First Amendment "since the 
inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment suggests that other con-
stitutional sources of protection for the right need culti-
vation. 1173 After the Griswold pronouncement, Beaney said: 
The disagreement of members of the majority as to 
the Constitutional underpinning of the claim is 
less important than the fact that they agreed that 
a right to privacy had a constitutional basis.74 
Thomas I. Emerson said that "the Court's choice of 
the privacy doctrine, as the basis of its decision seems 
sound" and that the doctrine "represents the narrowest and 
most precise formula available, and the one most relevant 
to the issues presented." He felt that the creation of the 
privacy right "meets a critical need of society, and the 
new doctrine seems to have a viable and significant future."75 
Importance and Scope of Griswold 
Actually, there were numerous possibilities for 
dealing with the Griswold case: the equal protection clause, 
the First Amendment, substantive due process, the right to 
privacy, or the Ninth Amendment. 76 The importance of the 
case lay, however, in which choice was made and how it was 
proposed to be applied. In the equal protection area there 
73william M. Eeaney, "The Constitutiorial Right to Pri-
vacy in the Supreme Court," in The 1962 Supreme Court Review, 
ed: Philip B. Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
196J), pp. 250-51. 
74william M. Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American 
Law," Law and Contemuorarv Problems Jl (Spring 1966): 263. 
75Emerson, "Nine .Justices," p. 233. 
76see generally, Emerson, ibid., for an excellantdis-
cussion of these alternatives. 
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were two possible claimss first, that the enforcement of the 
statute only against birth control clinics was discrimina-
tion against lower income classes of people, and second, that 
the statute effectively favored unmarried persons as against 
married couples?? The use of the First Amendment claim would 
be possible only if a majority would allow it to be broadly 
interpreted so as to include conduct, since the case involved 
actual dispensing of contraceptives. Substantive due process 
would be a difficult route since, as previously mentioned, 
it summoned up the long-dead "Lochner" approach, besides in-
volving the Court in making a purely moral judgment on a con-
troversial issue. The Ninth Amendment had never been used 
to overturn a state statute, and was too untried to be used 
here to build a court majority. 
For these reasons it can be inferred that the Court 
had no choice but to establish a new constitutional right to 
privacy. After having decided on the objective, the course 
had to be charted. It involved three problemsa (1) source of 
the right, (2) standards for application, and (3) scope of 
its application. Sources have been extensively discussed 
through the opinions of the justices. The standards, how-
ever, were not made very clear by the Court. Justice· Douglas 
seems to distinguish between the constitutionally invalid pro-
hibition of ~ and the constitutionally permissible state regu-
lation of manufacture or sale. He also alludes to the undue 
??contraceptives could be sold in Connecticut for 
prevention of diseq.sA, therefor9 favorin<": singles a~d -:;~;:-sow: 
engaged in extra-marital rela~ions. Ibid., p. 220, 
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breadth of the Connecticut law.7 8 
Justice Goldberg took the ''undue breadth" approach, 
but also tbok a balancing approach as a standard for applying 
the right to privacy, placing a heavy burden of justifica-
tion on the state. It is the Goldberg approach which was 
suggested by one Court observer to be the likely standard 
for future decisions dealing with privacy interests. 
,,, a balancing of factors, with the government 
required to show a "compelling interest" supple-
mented bv doctrines of undue breadth, vagueness 
and the feasibility of alternative measures,79 
As to the third problem involved in effectively 
enunciating a constitutional right to privacy--scope of its 
application--the Court gave only subtle hints. It was the 
potential ramifications of the new right to privacy that 
had observers in 1965 wondering what was to come. However 
skeptical many observers of the Court were concerning the 
legal underpi~nings of the right to privacy, one of them 
noted that the "greater significance" of Griswold was the 
Court's "forthright declaration, finally, that it would recog-
nize as constitutional, claims of liberty not specifically 
tied to enumerations of the Bill of Rights, 80 Professor 
Alan F, Westin, who is recognized as an authority on privacy 
in America, felt that favorable public reactions to the Gris-
wold decision legitimized his position that a right to privacy 
. 81 is "vital to the present era." In 1966 Westin defended the 
78 4 4 J81 u.s. 79, 85. 
79Emerson, . "Nine Justices," pp. 230-1. 
90,,,.11· m· :-- :: ~ ...... "'.. 11~'-n ,~_; ~ ••. -, • (' ~ h 
oil_ la., •'·• -ec.,.-.1, "'I:- _:r·'-'-" :O __ 'l va",e ::i.r:d t.1e ... 
panding Right to Privacy," ',•/isconsinia~Review ( 1966): 9:~5. 
. 
81Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Athe-
neum, 1967), p. 355. 
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unitary right to privacy in this statement: 
If the Supreme Court's actions in the past fif-
teen years are viewed not as an extension of parti-
cular provisions of the Bill of Rights but as a 
case-by-case evolution of a function~}, consti-
tutional theory of personal and ~roup privacy, 
the concept of privacy does not at all emerge 
as a "negative" concept in the Court's juris-
prudence; it serves to protect positive needs 82 
of individuals and ore:anizations in our society.·. 
However, it appeared to other observers that the 
"penumbral" theory of privacy "would enable the Court to 
move its peripheries out boundlessly and at will."83 This 
fear was dismissed by sor.:e who said the scope of Griswold 
was generally misunderstood by failing to distinguish from 
the Court's dicta the actual holding which did not require 
the right to privacy to be absolute in every matter. 84 
Nevertheless, it was certain that the very breadth and vague-
ness of the opinion left the door open for "continued prob-
ing and refinement of the privacy principle."85 
If the scope of the right were measured strictly by 
the holding of the Court, and not the dicta, one would be 
concerned only with the treatment of the only specific pri-
vacy right mentioned--right of "marital privacy"--or in Jus-
tice Goldberg's opinion--rights of "marital privacy," the 
"marital home," and "to marry and raise a family." Thus, 
it would have been conceivable that the Court would consider 
82Alan F. Westin, "Science, Privacy, and Freedom: 
Issues and Proposals for the 1970's," part 2: "Balancing the 
Conflicting Demands of Privacy, Disclosure, and Surveillance," 
Columbia Law Review 66 (November 1966): 1234. 
BJPercival ~. cTackson, ~j.::::s:nit_1;i ~he SUt?~3'.:": Co.::.:_".'+;, 
(Norman, C•kla.: Universit:,· o: Cl~la!lorr.a ?ress, l'.7·:!9), p. 52.u. 
84Holder, "Old Wine," p. 2R9. 
85Dixon, "The Griswold Penumbra," p. 205. 
52 
a right to privacy constitutionally recognizable only in 
the marriage relationship. However, since the ~ourt no-
where in the opinion made such a limitation on its power 
in future cases involving privacy interests, it was not a 
reasonable prediction, 
since constitutional doctrines have a way of ex-
panding beyond the boundaries of the original case 
Cand] • • • where, as here, the right established is 
one which responds so acutely to the growing needs 
of the society.86 
If there existed the real possibility for the pri-
vacy doctrine to expand, at least in the context of mar-
riage, family, procreation, and raising children, it was 
possible that action by the government to compel or limit 
births would also come within the invasion of privacy rights. 
The Griswold case thus held implications for sterilization 
laws, abortion laws, and government imposed birth control 
programs~? It was possible for the right to privacy even 
to extend to other sex laws prohibiting such acts as adul-
tery, homosexuality, and "perverse" sexual acts, although 
Justices Goldberg and White had expressly disclaimed that 
intention in their opinions. It was even conceivable that 
the right to privacy would be employed in a variety of other 
situations, such as electronic eavesdropping, various police 
practices, government investigations, loyalty oaths, official 
records of arrest, and the procedures of investigation in-
1 d . . 1 lf d . . t t. 88 vo ve in socia we are a minis ra ion. 
86Emerson, "Nine Justices," p. 2JJ. 
87rbid. I ·P· 232. 
88Ibid., pp. 232-JJ, 
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To be sure, the Griswold decision was vague, "and 
it is a certainty that when the Supreme Court of the United 
States employs vagueness in a decision, it is guaranteeing 
future litigation. 1189 With the assurance of litigation, 
the Court would face several choices: whether to narrow the 
priva6y right, or use it at all; whether to seek a tradi-
tional course for protecting the "unenumerated liberties" 
through the due process or equal protection clauses; or 
whether to broadly interpret other enumerated rights such 
as the First and Fourth Amendments as they protect indivi-
dual privacy. 
89Holder, "Old Wine," p. 302. 
CHAPI'ER III 
THE COURSE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION 
AFTER GRISWOLD 
Several generalizations made after the Griswold 
decision now furnish meaningful insight into the Court's 
theory of a constitutional right to privacy almost a decade 
late rs 
(1) Development of the right to privacy was still 
subject to "continuing probing and refinement."1 
(2) Griswold created "varied and flexible under-
pinnings to fit those situations that don't fit 
into established categories neatly but still seem 
to rest on values thought to be vital"2 
(3) The likely standard for measuring right to 
privacy claims would be the Goldberg approach of 
a "balancing of factors" including the government's 
showing of a "compelling interest," "undue breadth" 
or "vagueness," and "feasibility of alternative 
measures."3 
(4) "The actual holdings ••• did not require the 
right to privacy to be absolute in every matter."4 
(5) The "vagueness" of the Griswold opinion was a 
guarantee of future litigation.5 
1Robert G. Dixon, "The Griswold Penumbra: Constitu-
tional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?" Michigan Law 
Review 64 (December 1965): 205. 
2Ibid •• 
)Thomas I. Emerson, "Nine Justices in Searcl:t of a 
Doctrine," Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 2Jl. 
4Angela R. Holder, "Old Wine in New Bottles? The 
Right of ?ri~rac:i ~~d :7~ .. 1tu~e :~choc1 l ?~'J.~·'·:r C:J.ses,., rJc~1~~:--.::·~~­
of Churcfi and State 12 (Spring 1970): 289 • 
.5rbid., p. 302. 
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All of these points have been relevant to the Court's 
determination of privacy rights since Griswold. The fact that 
decisions since Griswold upholding a privacy right have been 
based not on the "penumbral" theory but on an enumerated 
guarantee, either the First or Fourth Amendment or the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, tends to support fully the prediction that the pri-
vacy right was subject to "continuing probing and refinement." 
Griswold_ 's "varied and flexible underpinnings 1 laid the ground-
work for a variety of personal privacy claims to be upheld 
through the use of due process, equal protection, and speci-
fically enumerated rights. Such balancing factors as "vague-
ness," "compelling state interest," "undue breadth," and 
I 
I 
"feasibility of alternative measures" became the standards 
for weighing the right to privacy against the state's in-
terest and finding it "not .•. to be absolute in every matter .. " 
Although the privacy right was not found to be abso-
lute in every matter, the constitutional holding of Gri.§..Y[old 
was flexible enough to reach into such areas as protecting 
pornographic materials in the home and guaranteeing the rights 
to marry whomever one chooses, to have or not to have children, 
and to make personal decisions in matters of family life. Fi-
nally, as to the last statement quoted above, the "vagueness" 
of Griswold has definitely generated litigation, for among 
those claims of privacy which followed Griswold, other than 
those just mentioned, were claims of rights to determine per-
sonal appearance· and hairsty~e a~d to co~munal and ot~er ~on-
traditional lifestyles, besides the many cases in criminal 
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action which were appealed on claims of invasion of privacy. 
After Griswold came more practical applications of 
the privacy doctrine. Such high sounding natural rights 
theories as Justice \'/illiam Douglas had expressed in Gr:i.s_!Yold 
were rarely heard from the Court in relation to the privacy 
claims it faced. The Court seemed bent on refusing to use 
the "penumbral" rights theory, althoue;h it significantly re-
affirmed First and }'ourth Amendment rights of privacy in the 
past decade. 6 However, privacy rights protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, involving a variety of personal situa-
tions, were not based on a general right of privacy, but on 
the sexual, marital, and familial privacy rights enunciated 
in Griswold. 
Since Griswold, two separate branches7of the privacy 
right are distinguishable: the first involving protection of 
the home and personal possessions, including personal thoughts 
and conduct, primarily through First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights and the guarantee against self~incrimination in the 
Fifth Amendment, and the second branch--the area specifically 
protected in Griswold--involving protection of sexual inti-
macies and personal decisions affecting marriage, procreation, 
6u.s. Senator Sam Ervin, D-N.C., Chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, has said that on the ba-
sis of the complaints received by the committee, he has con-
cluded that 
the great majority of the grievances vrhich indivi-
duals voice today about invasions of privacy are 
nothing more or less than violations of constitu-
tional guarantees, especially those contained in the 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments .•• " 
Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., "Privacv and the Constitution," North 
Car,_o"""'l=i~n=a'--:::_-'-2-i'l ~eview 50 (Au;:ust 197!:): 1017. ----
7This theory has been adapted from "Application of the 
Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dismissals from 
Public Employment," Duke Law Journal (December 1973): 1044-5. 
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child bearing, and child rearing, through the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The right of privacy appears to have become two-fold, im-
plying "secrecy" in the first area and both "solitude" and 
"autonomy" in the latter. Secrecy is an appropriate desig-
nation for the first area, expressed primarily as the home 
and personal possessions, including conduct and ideas, be-
cause it is an area which the government seeks to invade 
by forcing exposure of personal actions and ideas. Soli-
tude and autonomy denote an intimate area of privacy in 
which the government is not necessarily snooping or forcing 
exposure, but in which it may attempt to interfere or regulate. 
I, 
i 
These two general areas will serve as the organiza-
tional framework for the following survey of privacy cases 
with which the Court has dealt from the Griswold decision 
in 1965 through May 1974. Under Personal Secreqy in the 
_Home and Possessions, Including Conduct and Ideas, the fol-
lowing will be discussed: unreasonable search and seizure 
and surveillance, privacy of the home, privacy of associa-
tion, and privacy of personal information. Under Solitude 
and Autonomy, Involving Personal Intimacies and D~cisions, 
privacy of marriage, family, procreation, abortion, child-
rearing, and sexuality will be discussed. The first area of 
privacy involving personal secrecy is discussed to determine 
whether the Court's traditional regard for Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment guarantees of privacy from Boyd through Mapp and 
to be related by the Court to the new general right of privacy 
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which was announced in Griswold. 
Privacy cases which relied explicitly on Griswold, 
and those which did 'not, will then be analyzed statistically, 
and that findii:g will be compared with conclusions this study 
has made about.the trend of decisions affecting privacy in-
terests. Finally, an area of privacy involving personal se-
crecy which the Court has not yet dealt with adequately--
government accumulation of personal information--will be dis-
cussed along with the outlook for protection of privacy by 
other agents of the government. 
Personal Secrecy in the Home and Possessions, J 
Including Conduct and Ideas 
Freedom from Unreasonable 
Se~rches and Seizures 
In the area of safeguards for privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment, such as the prohibition of "unreasonable" searches 
and seizures and the requirement for warrants to issue only 
upon "probable cause," the Court continued to delineate the 
permissible scope of searches and to qualify standards of 
"reasonableness." In Chimel v. California, 395 u.s. 752 
(1969), the Court reversed a conviction on the grounds that 
the search, though here incident to a lawful arrest, violated 
. 8 H the Fourth Amendment's test of "reasonableness." owever, 
in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. __ , 94 S. Ct. 467 
(1973), "reasonableness" included more than a search of the 
suspect's outer clothing for weapons. Justice Lewis F. 
8~ R. h d t.1 G "f'h. 1 '"' i · .c- • ,. ;:)ee ic ar '". · 2.nr!cn, ..,, ,_!"'le ''. 1 ..... 8- i _ o!:'n i_ a- - ·J?l.-
reas onable Risks of Unreasonable Invasions of Privacy:-" Cre-
gon Law Review 49 (June 1970): 411. 
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Powell, Jr., concurring in Robinson, said: 
The search incident to arrest is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment because the privacy 
interest protected by the constitutional guar-
antee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest.9 
Citing Robinson as precedent, the Court in Gustafson v. 
Florida, 414 U.S. ~• 94 s. Ct. 488 (1973), affirmed the 
conviction of possession of marijuana after a search and 
seizure subsequent to arrest. 
In Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 3~7 U.S. 294 
(1967), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' protections were 
claimed to have been abridged by the seizure of incriminating 
materials. However, the Court upheld the seizure since the 
materials were "evidentiary," Justice Douglas dissented on 
the grounds that the right to privacy protected by the 
Fourth Amendment with regard to personal effects had been 
unconstitutionally invaded. He spoke of the Court's tradi-
tional regard for privacy from Boyd through MapR and said: 
"This right of privacy, sustained in Griswold, is kin to the 
right of privacy created by the Fourth Arnendrnent. 1110 
One of the Burger Court's most recent decisions in-
volving the search and seizure of evidentiary material from 
an arrestee's body was in United States v. Edwards, 42 USLW 
4463 (1974). The Court held there that the Fourth Amendment 
should not be extended to exclude from evidence certain 
clothing taken from the arrestee while he is in custody. 
Joining in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Potter 
Stewart· were Justices William Douglas, William Brennan, and 
994 S. Ct. 467, 494. 
10387 u.s. 294, 324. 
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Thurgood Marshalls 
The intrusio~ here was hardly a chocking one, and 
it cannot be said that the police acted in bad 
faith. The Fourth Amendment, however, was not 
designed to apply only to situations where the 
intrusion is massive and the violation of privacy 
shockingly flagrant. Rather, as the Court's 
classic admonition in Boyd .•. put the matters 
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its 
mildest and least repulsive forn: but illegiti-
mate and un~onstitutional practices get their 
first footing in that way, •• , 11 11 
In two recent cases involving compulsory disclo-
sure to the government of personal financial records, the 
Court reached two distinctly similar conclusions about the 
privacy claims asserted. In the first case, Couch v, 
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), where government's de-
mand of an individual's tax records was claimed to have vio-
lated his right to privacy, the Court held that the pri-
vacy interest could not be claimed since the appellant had 
surrendered his privacy right when he gave his records to 
his accountant. More important, however, was the additional 
conclusion by the Court that privacy was not a claim here 
since much of tax information is public property anyway. 
Since the disclosure of the tax information exerted no "phy-
sical or moral compulsion," the criteria for Fifth Amend-
ment privacy protection had not been met. 12 
In the second case, California Bankers Aspociatio~ 
v, Shultz, 94 s. Ct. 1494 (1974), the Court upheld the con-
troversial- Bank Secrecy Act which requires in part that banks 
1142 usr:1 4l~tSJ, 4tr:7 ( 1974). 
12 . 409 u.s. 322, JJ6 (197J), 
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disclose the names of those involved in domestic trans-
actions of $10,000 or more. On the basis of standing, the 
Court overturned a lower court's ruling that the domestic 
disclosure requirement invaded the Fourth Amendment right 
of privacy. However, the Court, relying in part on Couch, 
said there was no invasion here of either a Fourth Amendment 
right or a right of privacy through the self-incrimination 
clause of the Fifth Amendment, since the "mere maintenance'' 
by the banks of records required no disclosure to the govern-
ment without due legal process. 13 Furthermore, the Court 
sustained the government's contention that the law's provi-
sions were a constitutionally permissible means to counter 
increasingly sophisticated crime. The dissenters were two 
"right to privacy" advocates, Justices Douglas and Marshall. 
Justice Douglas said that "customers have a constitutionally 
justifiable expectation of privacy in the documentary de-
tails of the financial transactions reflected in their bank 
accounts."14 
In criminal cases involving seizures of physical prop-
erties of the body, the Court has not extended a right of pri-
vacy through the Fourth Amendment, the self-incrimination 
clause of the Fifth_, or through the Griswold decision, to pro-
tect the plaintiffs. In Schme~ber v. California, J94 U.S. 
757 (1966), the Court rejected a Fourth and Fifth Amendments' 
challenge to a compulsory blood-alcohol test since the test 
was "reasonable" and imposed no risk, and the probable cause 
l394 S. Ct. 1494, 151J-14 (1974). 
14Ibid., p. 1~27. 
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for defendant's arrest justified the test. Both Justices 
William Douglas and Hugo Black dissented in Schmerber, Jus-
tice Douglas said that he adhered to the views he expressed 
in his Breithaunt dissent, adding that since Griswold, the 
right to privacy was held to be within the penumbra of some 
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Justice Black 
dissented, saying that the Court had wrongly departed from 
the teachings of Boyd, broadly construing the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. 
Following the rejection of the privacy challenge in 
Schmerber, the Court upheld in United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 213 (1967), the requirement for a defendant to exhibit 
his person for observation by prosecution witnesses at a 
post-indictment lineup. Also relying on Schmerber, but citing 
the "reasonableness" rule of Chimel, the Court even held 
permissible in Cupp, Penitentiary Supt, v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 
291 (1973), the taking of incriminating samples of dried 
blood from a suspect's fingernails in the course of his ar-
rest. However, in Davis v. rr:ississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), 
the Court overturned a rape conviction on the grounds that 
fingerprinting petitioner without a warrant and using the 
results to convict him constituted a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights since there had been adequate opportunity 
for police to obtain a warrant. Justice Black dissented on 
the grounds that the decision was 
but one more in an ever-expanding list of cases 
in which this Court has been so widely blowing 
up tl:e ?·ourth ..:i.;:;e:::i::.2r:t 's scope tha·: its origir:::-:' 1 .~ 
authors would be hard put to recognize their creation:.) 
15394 u.s. 721, 729 (1969). 
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Thus, Fourth and Fifth Amendment privacy interests 
in search and seizure cases involving police procedures con-
tinued to be balanced against the state's interest in self-
protection by such tests as "reasonableness," "fact of ar-
rest," and the necessity for seizine "evidentiary" material, 
especially when evidence was liable to be moved away if not 
seized immediately. However, in the area of administrative 
searches, the Court overruled its 1957 Frank decision. 
Frank had left unanswered the question of what grounds must 
be present to justify the inspector's right to enter one's 
home, and doubts developed about the viability of the deci-
sion, especially since two members of the bare majority in 
Frank--Justices Felix Frankfurter and Charles E. Whittaker--
had retired from the Court. Camara v. r.:unicipal Court of 
City and Co. of San Francisco, 397 U.S. 523 (1967), held that 
the Fourth Amendment prevents prosecution for a citizen's 
refusal to permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection 
of a personal residence, The Court required that i~spections 
meet reasonable legislative or administrative standards. In 
a companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), 
the Fourth was held to apply equally to business premises. 
However, in another administrative search case, Wyman v. 
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), a New York State caseworker's 
"visit" at a welfare recipient's home was upheld as ."rea-
sonable" and the Court upheld the termination of welfare 
benefits . 16 
16
see Wayne R. ia?ave, "Admini strati ve Searches 2 ~,r; 
the Fourth Amendment: The Canara and See Cases," in The 1967 
Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B, Kurland (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Ch~c:;.~o Press, 1968), p. 33, where he says the Camara 
and See decisions were not enough, Even more critical,~-
Freedom From 
Unreasonable SurveillanQe 
64 
The Court still refused to hold electronic sur-
veillance unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
The privacy interests involved were not deemed compelling 
unless physical "trespass" had been involved, as in United 
States v, Black, J84 U.S. 98J (1966), where a spike micro-
phone ·inserted into a wall to monitor defendant's conversa-
tion was held to be a "trespass" and therefore an abride;e-
ment of Fourth Amendment rights. Yet in Osborn v. United 
States, 385 U.S. J2J (1967), the use of a hidden recording 
device on the person of a federal agent to record incrimi-
nating statements which defendant made to the agent, was 
upheld by the Court. Justice Douglas dissented, advocating 
the recognition here of a constitutional right to privacy. 
His often-quoted opinion is increasingly relevant to the 
age of electronic surveillance: 
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, 
where everyone is open to surveillance at all 
times, where there are no secrets from govern-
ment, The aggressive breaches of privacy by the 
Government increase by geometric proportions. 
Wiretapping and "bue;ging" run rampant, without 
effective judicial or legislative control. 
Secret television circuits in industry, ex-
tending even to restrooms, are common .•.• 
These examples and many others demonstrate an 
alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity 
of our citizens is being whittled away by some-
times imperceptible steps.17 ' 
says, is the need to ensure that authorized inspections are 
conducted with as little intrusion upon the citizen's {non-
rebel's)- privacy as possible. "The aspect of privacy of 
greatest concern to the greatest number of people is not re-
be1ling against the inspection, but havine the inspection at 
a convenient time." This type of litigation, he concedes, is 
infrequent, and it is unlikely the Court will be called upon 
to provide this protection, Therefore, the "only hope" is 
legislative and administrative self-control and a developing 
sensitivity to the problem. See also Daniel M. Migliore and 
Ronald D, Ray, "\'i'T'_'.'.1,_,n v.._!_l..:...,,::.::2_: Is a ~:2_n 's :-:or.~ St1.ll !:is 
"' t, "" - 1 n ~ •" - • .• ,.,, t 'r'>?l) J/Q vaS J..e ! !.!..Q_!:lr:na OI • z~;:a..:._'.' .._ .:.':! .i•J \ .tln er .L;;' : 0 • 
17385 u.s. J2J, J41. 
65 
The Court in BergP.r v, New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), 
seemed to signal some change in the Court's direction, by 
holding that wiretapping was under Fourth Amendment sanc-
tions and by invalidating a New York statute authorizing 
official wiretapping. The Court reversed by 6 to 3 the con-
viction of Ralph Berger for conspiracy to bribe the chair-
man of the state liquor authority, since evidence had been 
obtained by wiretaps. But no clearcut opinion emerged; 
three statements were delivered by the majority and three 
by the minority. Even Justice Douglas in the majority and 
Justice Black in the minority agreed on one points Olmstead 
had been overturned. Justice Tom c. Clark, however, writing 
one of his last opinions before his resignation, did not 
. . 18 
say so, nor did the other Justices. 
Greater unanimity prevailed less than a year later 
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the 
Court said that government agents involved in electronic 
eavesdropping were obligated to follow the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment. 19"Suspicion" was not enough. A war-
rant was required, The Court emphasized that it would not 
make all bugging impermissible, but that the carefully li-
mited use of electronic surveillance wquld be permissible 
when preceded by a warrant. The Court, however, did make 
"national security" and other prescribed areas, such as 
kidnapping, exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
18Morris L. Ernst, The Great Reve sals: Tales of the 
SuT)reme Court (new York: '.'!e,.·hri:c:ht ci71d 'i.'all(;", 1973, r•. l~l. 
l9rn ~atz, a conversation from a telephone booth 
.was overheard by the FBI seeking evidence that Katz was trans-
mitting wagering information across state lines. A "bug" 
was planted on top of the booth. 
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Justice Stewart, writing the Court's opinion, said 
that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not· places" and 
that the government's eavesdropping "violated the privacy 
upon which [defendant] justifiably relied. 1120 Justice Black 
was the sole dissenter in Katz. After reminding the Court 
of what he had said in his Griswold dissent, he said: 
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the 
extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures of· "persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects." No general right is created by the Amend-
ment so as to give this Court the unlimited power 
to hold unconstitutional everything which affects 
privacy.21 
Katz. was not a total ban on unwarranted electronic 
surveillance, for it had made the exceptions for "national 
security" reasons and other specified areas. However, after 
Katz secured the warrant restraint on electronic eaves-
dropping, Congress acted at once to·broaden the scope of 
eavesdropping by enacting the "Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968." In Title III, "Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance," permission was granted for court-
approved interceptions by federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officials in investigating a large number of 
crimes, and authority was given to the President to take 
measures he deemed necessary to safeguard the security of 
the nation. The Omnibus Act was an indication that the con-
cern over "the plethora of problems riding a rising crime 
wave was echoed by the emergence of 'law and order' ~s a 
crucial political priority." The public was obviously "sold 
?Q . 
~ 389 U.S. 347, J)O. 
21Ibid. , 373. 
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on the need for new laws allowing police investigatory 
forces to use electronic surveillance, 1122 
The Court, however, qualified the "national secu-
ri ty" exceptions of Katz in United S_tates v. U. S, District. 
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), where the federal government 
had engaged in the unwarranted electronic surveillance of 
dissident political groups under a veil of "national domes-
tic security." The government attempted to use in its pro-
secution of dissidents the results of its wiretapping as 
evidence of identity. The Court in an 8-0 decision, held 
that even in the interest of domestic security, Fourth Amend-
ment qualifications must be observed and that electronic 
surveillance is an impermissible investigative method unless 
judicially authorized by a warrant. The Court was confronted 
here with the issues of the power of the President, through 
his Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance. 
The Government's reliance on the Omnibus Act of 1968 was 
held by the Court to be without merit. There are two very 
significant facts about the Court's decision: "the govern-
ment's attempts to revitalize the general warrant in the 
guise of national security has been decisively thwarted, 1123 
and there is a "thread of privacy running through this case 
22Edward J. Gallagher and Robert M. Hollis, "Fed-
eral Decisions on the Constitutionality of Electronic Sur-
veillance Le~islation," The American Criminal Law Review 11 
(Spring 1973): 655. The legislative history of th~ Omnibus 
Act is found in Richard Harris, "Annals of Legislation-- the 
Turning Point," The New Yorker, 14 December 1968, p. 68. 
23Alan 7'eisel, "~-o~:::s:-c2- :ur-rei2.~2.::,ce :i.~d :r:2 ?::n:.:-"::-: 
Amendment," University of l-'i0tsburgh Law Heview JS (?all 
1973): 70. 
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vital to the formulation of a possible new standard. 1124 
Such a standard for "upgrading of individual pro-
tection may not be forthcoming through traditional means 1125 
of the Fourth Amendment. It is vital that the. constitutional 
right to privacy be more explicitly recognized in the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantees, as Justice Louis Brandeis urged 
long ago in his Olmstead dissent, and that law enforcers be-
come more personally sensitive to the threats to individual 
and group privacy. 26 In the wake of the United States District 
Court opinion, one court observer wrote very appropriately: 
In the final analysis, therefore, the application of 
the warrant requirement to political surveillance--
as in all other forms of search and seizure for which 
it is required--necessitates the same kind of volun-
tary and good faith compliance by government~l of-
ficials with constitutionally sanctioned procedures 
as do all other instances of the implementation of 
fundamental rights of the individual. Sadly, the events 
of recent years and months indicate the paucity of 
bona fides among our elected officials and their ap-
pointed assistants.27 
The prohibition of searches or surveillance without 
court order is becoming increasingly significant to the twin 
policy objectiv~s of preserving morality of government and 
24Richard A. Goren, "The Trumpet of Technology Calls 
for a New Constitutional Tune--Constitutional Contours of 
Pre-arrest Procurement of Physical Evidence of Identity," 
Suffolk University Law Review 7 (Summer 1973): 1025. 
25Ibid., p. 1030. 
26For example, it has even been suggested that police 
helicopter surveillance should be limited so as not to con-
stitute an "invasion of the sanctity of a man's home and the 
privacies of life." See Amy Shiner, "Police Helicopter Sur-
veillance," Arizona Law Review 15 (1973): 145. 
27F:!eisel, "Political Surveillance," pp. 70-1. Ref-
erence is here implied to the break-ins, durin~ President 
Nixon's re-election ca~~~i~~ in 1072, of the ~e~oc~at~c :a~tY 
Headquarters in the ~atergate, into the office of Dr. Louis 
Fielding, psychologist for the "Pentagon Papers" defendant, 
Daniel Ellsberg, and other "dirtv tricks" associated with the 
Nixon Administration which proceeded without judicial super-
vision. 
o~ 
preserving the privacy of the individual. .. 28 The Fourth Amend-
ment's right to privacy is, in Justice Douglas~ words, not 
"self-executing," but is "only secure when its prohibitions 
are respected by law enforcement officers and enforced by 
the courts. 1129 
Associational Privacy 
In another area of personal secrecy, the Court since 
Griswold has reaffirmed its position concerning the impor-
tance of the privacy of association. (In NAACP v. Alabama, 
the Court had found a "vital relationship between freedom 
to associate and privacy in one's associations." Though 
freedom to engage in association is not a specifically enu-
merated right, it was nonetheless held to be "an inseparable 
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces freedom of speech."30) 
DeGregorv v. New Hampshire Attorney, 383 U.S. 825 (1966), like 
the cases Sweezv and Uphaus of the late 1950s,31arose out of 
a New Hampshire subversive activities investigation. The de-
fendant had refused to answer questions about his Communist 
activities prior to 1957. The Court reversed the contempt 
conviction, Justice Douglas writing that there was "no show-
ing of 'overriding and compelling state interest' that would 
warrant intrusion into the realm of political and associational 
28Robert B. McKay, "Self-Incrimination and the New 
Privacy," in The 1967 Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B. Kur-
land (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 212. 
29William O. Douglas, The Right of the People (Garden 
Cit~r, N.~.: Doubledayan'iCo., -:-::.8., ios 0 ), p. lSl. 
J0357 U.S. 449, 460, 462 (1958). 
31see above, pp. 23-4. 
(V 
. 
privacy protected by the First Amendment, 11 32 
Some strong arguments have been made in recent 
years for the recognition of associational privacy, not 
only in the area of ~olitical activities of groups, but 
also in their social activities. One proponent of this 
broader right of associational privacy says that "the 
right to select one's intimate associates free of govern-
mental compulsion, whether based upon the Griswold 'zone 
of privacy,• the Ninth Amendment, or 'traditional' notions 
of substantive due process, is 'fundamental.'" This right, 
however, would be "limited by its very nature to the most 
personal social relationships."33 
The Court has not ruled decisively on this ques-
tion, but in a restauranteur-sit-in case, Bell v. Mfi.ryla.nfu.. 
J78 U.S. 226 (1964), Justices William Douglas and Arthur 
Goldberg in concurring statements, distinguished between 
unconstitutional denial of services in an establishment 
open to the public, and private social relationships. Jus-
tice Goldberg said: 
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regret-
table, but it is the constitutional right of 
every person to close his home or club to any 
person or to choose his social intimates and 
business partners solely on the basis of per-
sonal prejudice including· race. These and other 
rights pertaining to privacy and private association 
are th~mselves constitutionally protected liber-
ties.34 
The question of the right to freely select one's 
. 
intimate associates and congregate in private clubs may yet 
)? . 
.... 3q3 U.S. ~25. 
JJMarc Rohr, "Associational Privacy and the Private 
Club: The Constitutional Conflict," Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 5 (April 1970): 466. 
34 378 U.S. 226, 313. 
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be directly dealt with by the Court. A recent case in-
volving a private club's refusal to serve a black man was 
decided by the Court without reaching the privacy question. 
In Moose lodge No. 107 v, Irvis, 1W7 U.S. 16J (1972), the 
Court reversed the lower court's decision requiring the 
state, as liquor licensor of the club, to take action to 
remedy racial discrimination by the club. The Court ruled 
that the private club's action was not state action.35 
Privacy of the Home 
Although in the areas of "personal secrecy in the 
home and possessions" discussed thus far, the Court's deci-
sions have not significantly reflected the impact of Gris-
wold, the Court has nevertheless recognized a new aspect 
of the personal secrecy area, thereby giving a new signi-
ficance to the right to privacy. This new aspect was de-
fined in an unusual case, Stanley v. Geo~, 394 u.s. 557 
(1969), as the "right to read or observe what [on~ pleases •.. 
in the privacy of (the] home. ,.36 However, the facts of the 
case and the underpinnings of the new right make Stanley 
relatively as difficult to interpret as was Griswold. For 
that reason, among others, it shows great potential for 
generating litigation covering a broad range of claims to 
personal activities in the home, and indeed has already 
done so. 
J5see "Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: 
Freedom of Association and Right to Privacy, " Du]<,,g_b3::'.1_}_qur-
n-:tl (Jccc~ber 1970): llr::l-22~, :'or '.'. r1i::oc·1:::sio:r1 o_' -t.:'.: >:.~­
ance that must be kept between associational privacy and state 
attempts to promote social, economic, and political equality. 
36394 u.s. 541, 564. 
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Although the appellant Stanley had been convicted 
of possession of obscene materials, his home had initially 
been legally entered and searched for evidence of book-
making. While finding little evidence of that activity, 
federal and state agents did find three rolls of eight-
millimeter film in a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom. 
The state officer concluded, after viewing the film with 
a projector and screen also found in the bedroom, that they 
were obscene, and seized them. 
Because of the seizure of materials for which the 
original warrant was not granted, -the Court might have 
characterized the case as a search and seiz~re problem like 
MaPJ2; or because of the content of the materials involved, 
I. 
it could have characterized it as an obscenity case like 
Roth v. U,S., J54 U.S. 476 (195?); or still another ground 
could have been the privacy right as in Griswold. The 
Court chose the last alternative. 27 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court, 
said that mere private possession of any materials, whether 
obscene or not, was constitutionally protected because there 
is a fundamental "right to be free, except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
one's privacy ... 38 The Court was not concerned with the ordi-
nary Fourth Amendment grounds concerning the technical re-
quirements of a warrant or the "reasonableness" of searches 
J7Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White, concurring, 
urged reversal on Fourth Amendment ~rounds that an j_lle~al 
search ::..n·i seiZu!.""e ::.2.: ~;:~-::c:: ~)l:i..ce. ~:-:)::·~.:cc: jlv..c~:, t}:~:):~~1 
a strict constructionist and foe of privacy, was neverthe-
less an absolutist in terms of protections afforded by the 
First Amendment, and concurred in Stanley, viewing it as 
upholding First Amendment guarantees of free expression. 
38394 u.s. 557, 564. 
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without warrants, nor was it directly concerned with a 
determination of what "obscenity" is. 
Since the state could not demonstrate a compelling 
interest for invading Stanley's private "library" of films 
in order to enforce the obscenity statute, the Court could 
find no basis for Stanley's conviction and thus held that 
private possession of obscene material "is (an1 insufficient 
justification for such a drastic invasion of personal lib-
erties. "39 The Court, in effect, established a First Amend-
ment form of "locus" or "res" test which had been only re-
cently rejected in Katz where the Court had said that the 
Constitution "protects people, not places."40 The Court was 
not determining whether the film was constitutionally pro-
tected, but whether the state interest in suppressing por-
nography outweighed the constitutional protection given 
to the home. The Court approved the validity of obscenity 
regulation to protect children and unwilling adults from 
exposure, but could not justify the validity of these in-
terests when mere private, consensual possession in one's 
home was on the balance. The Court made it clear that its 
ruling was intending no general rejection of the Roth doc-
trine in the distribution or public viewing of obscene ma-
terials, nor was it infringing upon the state's power to 
regulate "other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or 
stolen goods" in the home. 41 ~Y determining that the state's 
393~4 U.S. 557, 565. 
403g9 u .s. J4'-' I I J50 1 10,.7) l.~/b, • 
41394 U.S. 557, 564. 
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allegation of obscenity was an insufficient justification 
for invasion of Stanley's privacy, Stanley "suggests that 
the notion of privacy cannot stand alone. 1142 Although Jus-
tice Marshall wrote that the decision was not to disturb 
Roth's holding that obscenity is not protected by the First 
Amendment, his opinion, nevertheless, was expressed generally 
in First Amendment notions of freedom of expression and 
thought: "the right to :ead or observe what [one] pleases ..• 
in the privacy of [the] home: 4J "to receive information and 
ideas, regardless of their social worth; 1144 to determine 
"the moral content of [his] thoughts; .. 45 and "to satisfy 
his intellectual and emotional needs. 1146 
Legal experts and lower courts as well had prob-
lems interpreting Stanley's implications for obscenity, 
privacy, and searches and seizures. Though it had used 
First Amendment grounds, as well as privacy grounds, the 
Stanley decision is read now, after it has been tested 
by the lower courts and by the Supreme Court in recent ob-
scenity cases, as purely a privacy case. 47 In a review of 
42Al Katz, "Privacy and Pornography: Stanlev v. 
Georgia," in The 1969 Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B. 
Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 210. 
43394 u.s. 557, 564. 
44Ibid .. 
45Ibid., 565. 
46Ibid .. 
47"0n Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Perso-
nal Liberties," New "ork Universitv Law Review 48 (October 
1973): 687. Others have read St,?.nle'r differently, however, 
rejecting the "purely private" theory and asserting a "pri-
vac~~-n1u~" th~or"".r ':l~ic!: :::ee:.,.... t'J b:; s~ :--~~ , .. the ~(~::;n,!""'.'"~.i t~ c7: 
that -privacy of the :-:o:~,e car.not ·c(; ::.r. ::;_esolute r.:..:·:;:, ~~:-~-;: 
is subject to invasion when the state asserts a subordinating 
interest. See "Still ~·:ore Ado About Dirty Books (and Pictures): 
Stanlev, Reidel, and TIU-rt'r-Seven Photogranhs," Yale Law 
Journal 81 (November 1971): 309-JJ. 
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the 1968 Supreme Court term, the Harvard Law Review termed 
Stanley's formulation as a clear First Amendment one and 
foresaw the task ahead of determining protected as opposed 
to unprotected forms of obscenity distribution. 49 The be-
lief that Stanlev represented a dramatic shift in the Court's 
view of obscenity regulation was shared by a number of lower 
courts. ~etween 1969 and 1972, over fifty obscenity cases 
in the lower federal courts alone concerned the scope of the 
Stanley decision. 49 For instance, in Karalex5s v. Bvrne, J06 
F. Supp. 1J6J (D. ~ass. 1969), the court enjoined the state's 
prosecution of a theater owner under Massachusetts' obscen-
ity laws for exhibition of "I Am Curious (Yellow)" in a pub-
lic theater.5° 
No occasion arose for a full treatment of the prob-
lems posed by Stanlev until late in the 1970-71 term with 
the decisions in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), 
and United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. J6J 
( 1971). The Court proceeded fu these cases to "whi ttl (e) 
Stanley's holding down to its facts" and exposed the decision 
as "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is 
his castle. , .. 51rn Reidel, pornographic booklets had been 
mailed in violation of a federal statute. The Court distin-
guished between the private right to possess pornography ex-
pressed in Stanley and the legitimate power of the govern-
ment to regulate general obscenity: 
48
"The Supreme Court, 1968 Term," Harvard Law Review 
83 (Hovember 1969): 151-2. 
49"Still I·.~ore Ado," p. 313, n. J2. 
50ibid., p. Jl2. 
5l"On Privacy," p. 6g7, 
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The focus of this language in Stanfil was on 
freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy 
of one's home. It does not require that we 
. fashion or recognize a constitutional rieht 
in people like Reidel to distribute or sell 
obscene materials ..• 52 
Reidel and Thirtv-Seven Photographs so stringently 
limited a person's ability to acquire obscene materials 
from outside the home that Justice Black, who had strongly 
concurred in the Stanley decision as upholding First Amend-
ment rights of expression and thought, dissented in Thirty-
Seven Photos saying that now one can exercise his right in 
the home only if he "writes salacious books in his attic, 
prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living 
room. n53 
A series of more recent decisions, upholding govern-
mental regulation of public viewing of obscene films, Paris 
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973): upholding regu-
lation of the acquisition and importation of obscene mater-
ials, United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super qmm. Film 
et al., 413 U.S. 12J (197J); and regulation of the trans-
portation of obscene materials in interstate commerce, 
United States v. Ori to, 41J U.S. 139 (19?J), have further 
clarified the Court's intentions in Stanlev. Chief Justice 
Warren E. 3urger, delivering the Court's opinion in Paris, 
said the idea that "conduct involving consenting adults 
only is alwavs beyond state regulation is a step we are 
unable to take."54 Burger also made it clear that the state 
retains an interest in the ~oral content of its citizens' 
52402 u.s. 351, 356. 
53402 u.s. 363, 382. 
54413 u.s. 49, 68. 
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thoughts and can restrict that content to protect the mo-
rality of society and prevent anti-social conduct. Further-
more, the Court has shown in the recent case, Miller v, 
California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), that obscenity stan-
dards may vary throughout the nation, and it has therefore 
instructed the courts to apply communit:r standards to ob-
scenity regulation.55 
Since the Court erased all of Stanley's First Amend-
ment content, the privacy aspect of the home is the narrow 
basis left for the decision. The emphasis now firmly esta-
blished on simply "being at HOME" implies that one acquires 
the right to do things that one cannot do elsewhere. In 
fact, in United States v. Orito, Chief Justice Burger stated 
for the Court: 
rt is hardly necessary to catalog the myria1 
activities that may be lawfully engaged in 
within the privacy and confines of the home, 
but may be prohibited in public.56 
Activities such as smoking marijuana, gambling, and forni-
cation could all be claimed as rights protected by Stan-
ley's "privacy of the home." If Stanley does protect a range 
of activities similar in nature to private possession of 
obscene materials, then "privacy of th~ home" may prove to 
be a potent constitutional right. "Stanley must now be 
viewed as a supplement to the Fourth Amendment, giving added 
protection to the values of seclusion and repose centered 
about the ho.me • .. 5? However, to date, the courts have not made 
5503 s· ~t· 2~n" 2·~7 
,,.. • 'J • ~ v ( J .,,. r)...:... I • 
56 413 u.s. 139, 142-3. 
57"on Privacy," p. 754. 
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detailed inquiry into what activities may constitutionally 
go on in the home. Statutes regulating various· practices 
considered harmful to society have been afforded a pre-
sumption of constitutionality, Yet, at least one member of 
the Court has spoken of the potential of Stanley. Justice 
John M. Harlan placed Stanlev among the "(n'J ew 'substantive 
due process' rules, that is, those that place ... certain 
kinds of primary private individual conduct beyond the power 
of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe ... 58 
Other facets of Stanley in addition to "privacy of 
the home" allude to the possibility of a torrent of litiga-
tion. Stanley spoke of "the right to satisfy (one's] emo-
tional needs 11 59 and of the statute's "infringement of funda-
mental liberties."60 These statements could.be extrapolated 
into a general doctrine of limitations on state power in 
the area of "fundamental liberties to satisfy one's emo-
tional needs," such as private sexual conduct and drug use. 
In fact, in the area of marijuana rights, the report of the 
National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse has recom-
mended that all criminal sanctions be withdrawn from private 
!!§g_ and nossession of marijuana incident to such use, al-
though the production and distribution of the drug would 
. . . 1 t' . t. 61 H t 1 remain cr1m1na ac 1v1 1es. owever, a very recen eva ua-
tion of the Stanley-Paris impact on drug laws observes that 
58Justice Harlan, concurring and dissenting in ~cKav 
v. u.s., 401 u.s. 667, 692 (1971). 
59394 u.s. 557 , 565. 
GOibid., 564. 
61 Reported in N.Y. Times, ~arch 23, 1972, sect. 1, p. 
19, col. 1, and referred to in "Still i/Iore Ado, " p. 333. 
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" ••• the courts have been indifferent to arguments based 
on the right to privacy ..•• " The article concludes that 
the nation's courts are not likely to extend the liberties 
of drug users since Paris held that even though "some human 
'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be incidentally affected, 
this does not bar the State from acting to protect legi-
timate state interest. 1162 
Solitude and Autonomy, 
Involving Personal Intimacies and Decisions 
Griswold announced the existence of a constitutional 
zone of privacy, but "it did little to sketch the peri-
meters of that zone."63 The case had a combination of ele-
ments which lower courts and various justices on the Supreme 
Court have interpreted in different ways. Griswold involved 
a place, the home, which either because of the sanctity of 
the activity involved or the sanctity of the home itself, 
might invoke constitutional protection. The general area 
of secrecy in the home and personal possessions has shown 
relatively little success, except for Stanley's narrow 
holding, in invoking stricter constitutional protection, 
The Fourth Amendment exceptions to the home's privacy, the 
. . 
warrant and "reasonable" entry, in addition to qualifica-
tions made by the Court as to what is "reasonable" and.what ( 
is "trespass," have functioned thus far to make the privacy\ 
of the home and possessions easily invaded upon a showing · 
62
-_iero·f D ,.,l~r..._... "c~ :,.,..,,,..,.~ a;,.;d 
• V U-6~t - ... --v.·='"'-' .t.J. 
Civil Liberties Review 1 (Winter/Spring 
6J"on Privacy," p. 687, 
C:: :t.i '::lertv," 'I'.1e 
19'14): 124. 
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of a compelling state interest. Privacy in this area since 
Griswold is, althougb a "fundamental" interest, nevertheless, 
non-absolute. 
Since Griswold, however, another area of privacy 
which has become more conducive to invoking constitutional 
protection involves solitude in personal intimacies and au-
tonomy in personal decision-making. Regardless of whether 
the Court further develops the Stanlev-Paris notion of a 
protected locus, the Court has indeed made it clear that it 
will protect, apart from any locus test,~ertain funda-
mental privacy interests surrounding the solitude of human 
intimacies and the autonomy of personal decision-making 
relating to the course of a person's life) 
Marital and Familial Decisions 
The specific holding in Griswold that the "right of 
marital privacy" was a fundamental and constitutional right 
is now seen as part of a "rational continuum," in the words 
of Justice Harlan, of decisions protecting marriage, pro-
creation, and family rights as a fundamental '!liberty" 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The key cases in 
the early part of that "continuum" were Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (192J), in which the Court asserted that the 
·"right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children" 
is a part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment; ." 64 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 ( 1942), in 
64262 u.s. 390, 399. 
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which the Court held that compulsory sterilization of habi-
tual criminals was a violation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a denial of "one of the basic 
civil rights of man" and that "fm)arriage and procreation 
are fundamental to the survival of the race: 1165 and Pierce 
v. Soci~ty o:f Siste?;g, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the 
Court extended Fourteenth Amendment protection to the "li.b-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their contro1. 1166 
Although Skinn~ may be distinguishable as an equal 
protection case, and Neyer as a first amendment case, the 
characterization of family and procreation as "fundamental 
liberties" was a pertinent precedent for the Griswold holding 
and later decisions. It is suggested, furthermore, that 
Griswold marked a return to notions of substantive due pro-
cess in areas relating to personal liberty. 67 Continuing 
to develop this protection of the intimate relationship of 
marriage, the Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 
affirmed a constitutional right to marry across the color 
lines, terming marriage again as one of the "basic civil 
rights of man," and held that "to deny this fundamental free-
dom •.• is surely to deprive .•• citizens of liberty without 
68 . due process of law." Although "privacy" was not mentioned, 
the Court made a more fundamental determination of marriage 
65316 u.s. 535, 541. 
66268 u.s. 510, 543-5, 
6 7 ~ G , d ., . . . . . 1 n i · r . 
· :::iee -era~ 0untr.e!.' 2.r..a .·.oe _,o·;i ir:.G, ._,as es 2,r:c. 
rr:aterials on Individual RigbJ;s in Constitutional Law, 8th 
ed. (hlineola, N.Y.: Foundation ?ress Inc., 1970), p. 838. 
68 388 u.s. 1, 12. 
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and family rights through substantive due process language. 
The Court did this again in Levv v, Louisiana, J91 U.S. 68 
(1968), where it held that a Louisiana statute denying a 
right of recovery by illegitimate children upon the death 
of their mother was discrimination contravening the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
the "rights asserted ... involve the intimate familial 
relationship between a child and his mother. 1169 
The development of a zone of privacy protection 
around marriage and the family has thus far been viewed 
by the Court as a "traditional" zone. Although the Court 
has not dealt directly with rights to homosexual marriage 
or homosexual cohabitation without marriage, it recently 
confronted the right to adopt a non-traditional life-
style, that is, communal living. In Village of Belle Terre 
v. Boraas, 94 s. Ct. 15J6 (1974), a local zoning ordinance 
was challenged.which ban?Bi communal living by restricting 
land use to one-family dwellings occupied by "traditional" 
family units or groups of not more than two unrelated per-
sons. Action was brought to have the ordinance declared 
an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause 
and the rights of privacy, association, and travel. The 
Court voted 7-2 to sustain the right of localities to write 
zoning laws banning communal living in family residential 
areas. 
Surprisingly, since the claim of right of privacy 
had been asse!'ted, Justice Souglas •::as on the side of the 
69391 U.S. 68, 71. 
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majority and wrote the Court's opinion. He wrote that 
states are entitled to make that kind of economic and social 
judgment and enforce it with zoning laws. Justice Marshall 
took up the banner of right to privacy, nonetheless, and 
asserted that appellee's constitutional right to privacy 
had been violated by an ordinance unnecessarily burdening 
the First Amendment right to association. He also urged 
that the Court recognize that Griswold guaranteed the right 
to "establish a home" as an essential part of the "liberty" 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.70 
Yet in a case concerning a federal regulation of a 
non-traditional household, the Court took an opposite view, 
In Department of Agriculture v. ~oreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), 
I 
the Court affirmed the judgment of a three-judge district 
court that held as violative of the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment an amendment to the Federal Food Stamp 
Act which limited distribution of food stamps to households 
comprised of related persons. In this case, Justice Douglas 
concurred, observing that the provision "has an impact on 
the rights of people to associate."7l The strikingly dif-
ferent views of the Court in these cases either leads us 
to hypothesize that the Court has been inconsistent in the 
area of non-traditional living or that only where the govern-
ment interest in regulating non-traditional living is deemed 
insufficient by the Court, would the right of persous to live 
in non-traditional settings be constitutionally protected. 
7094 S. Ct. 1536, 1544. 
7l41J U.S. 528, 544. 
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Since Levy had held that the "illegitimate family" had equal 
rights to a "legitimate family," the latter hypothesis may 
be the answer. 72 
The Decision to Conceive 
As Griswold, Skinner, and NAACP have demonstrated, 
the Court has indicated a continuing unwillinr,ness to be 
bound by the specific terms of the Bill of Rights in de-
fending fundamental liberties.73 Since the Griswold deci-
sion, Loving, J&.yy, and Deuartment of Agriculture have used 
the fundamental rights approach to strike down statutes 
that violated the freedom to marry and the freedom of the 
"illegitimate" and "untraditional" family. Since the fun-
damental rights-due process approach "potentially allows 
courts so much discretion, judges .•• must take care to 
set self-imposed limits in the form of reasoned and clear 
statements of the interests that are being protected. 11 74 
Thus, when the courts confront governmental invasion in-
to private intimacies and decision-making, the question is 
whether the state's interest in the protection of public 
morality, health, or whatever, can justify the invasion. 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 4J8 (1972), suggests 
that important freedoms cannot be curtailed without a sub-
72see Jonathan Shor, "All in the 'Family: ' Legal 
Problems of Communes," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 7 {rv!arch 1972): 39J-4Jl. 
73Griswold v. Connecticut, Jl'.31. U.S. 479 ( 1965): 
penumbral theory of privacy and Fourteenth Amendment: Skinner 
v. Oklahor.la, 316 U.S. 535 (1942): equc.l nrotectio~ cls.'..ls:::~ 
+~a ?ourteenth Ame~d~e~~ ~recludcj abri~:-~ent of ~~e f~~da­
mental right of procreation; hAACP_y~abama, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958): First and Fourteenth Amendments protected the "privacy 
of association." 
74
"Recent Cases," Harvard Law Review 84 (April 1971): 
15JO. · 
85· 
stantial countervailing interest. Eisenstadt involved a 
Massachusetts statute which forbad the distribution of con-
traceptive devices to anyone but a married person. In a 
6-1 decision (Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H, 
Rehnquist did not participate), the Court held that, in 
allowing the distribution of contraceptives by physicians 
to married persons while prohibiting distribution to the 
unmarried, the statute employed a classification that 
was not ratio.nally related to a valid public purpose and 
therefore violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Somewhat out of context, however, 
the Court observed: 
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
. right of the individual, married or single, to · 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child.75 
It is noteworthy that Justice Potter Stewart 
joined the majority opinion in Eisenstadt, since he had 
dissented in Griswold. However, it may have been that 
Eisenstadt "strain(ed) for grounds of invalidation which 
would avoid the Griswold ..• issue. Direct confrontation 
of that issue would certainly have been controversial. 
Moreover, Justice William Brennan probably would have lost 
Justice ·stewart 's support if he had sought to extend Gris-
wold directly. ,,7·6 Also, it has been hypothesized that with 
the abortion cases due to be heard in that term, the Court 
75405 U.S. 433, 453, 6 .. 7 Gerald Gunther, "Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection," Harvard law Review 86 (November 1972): 34. 
R6 
did not wish to·jeopardize its options by giving a Gri.§.-
wold right to privacy interpretation to this decision. 77 
However,··in retrospect, the real importance of the deci-
sion.is 
the revelation that the Court was as cognizant 
as evervone else that the rationale of Griswold 
was not dependent on the privacy of the marital 
relationship, but rather on the privilege to 
engage in sexual intercourse with reasonable 
certainty of avoiding the possible consequences 
of pregnancy. If, as Chief Justice Burger said 
in his solo dissent, this smacks of substantive 
due process, it will not deter the Court from its 
conclusion, so long as it doesn't impose such 
a label on its res~lt.78 
Eisenstadt also suggests, though not explicitly 
st~tirig it, "that Griswold should not be read too narrowly," 
.In the line of the Skinner, NAACP, Stal)ley, Griswold, and 
Loving decisions, Eisenstadt again "reaffirms the Court's 
support for unspecified rights." It also "suggests that 
a·decision as to when a state must bear the extraordinary 
burden of justification for intruding into a personal de-
cision must refer to how fundamentally the activity in 
question affects the individual."79 
The Decision to Bear or Abort 
Although Eisenstadt had only tentatively in dictum 
upheld a right to privacy through the Griswold decision, 
the. words were there \~hi ch defined ·privacy as the "right 
of the individual" and as a right involving freedom from 
. . 
. ·· 
7711The Supreme Court, 1971 Term," Harvard Law Review 
86 (November 1972): 122. Q . . . 7 ~Philip 3. ~:urland, "1971 Term: The '.:"ear of the 
Stewart-1:/hi te Court," in The 1972 Supreme Court Review, ed: 
Philip 3. Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1973)' p.' 248 •. 
79 It On J;>ri vacy, " p. 697. 
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"unwarranted ..• intrusion into .•. the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child."80 Eisenstadt had not, however, 
displayed a judicial cohesiveness concerning the Griswold 
right of privacy since Chief Justice Burger had dissented; 
Justices Douglas and Byron White, the latter joined by 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, wrote concurring opinions; 
Justice Stewart joined the majority opinion, probablv 
because it did not rely on Griswold; and the two newest 
Justices, Powell and Rehnquist, did not participate. 
The abortion cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
and Doe v. 3olton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), which the Court 
decided in its 1972 term, however, "indicated a judicial 
cohesiveness "81 and "elevated [the EisenstadtJ dictum to 
a constitutional mandate."82 Several of the justices joined 
in grounding the independent right of privacy in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of "liberty" and in including 
within that right the right to decide on abortion. Con-
curring were Burger and Po~ell, supposedly appointed to 
provide a greater conservative balance on the Court. Jus-
tice Rehnquist dissented, saying that the Court was in 
effect returning to substantive due process philosophy. 
In Wade, the district court had ruled that the 
right of single and married persons to choose whether to 
have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment through 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the statute was uncon-
80 405 u.s. 438, 453. 
81u 1 o· . l .. -. ";). 
,.are'! ,,iede_, .:.-rer::nco.n2'.r, ~rivac•r, anrl ~'.°'1-? Co:".2-:-.:.-
tution: The Court at the Crossroads," University of ~lorida 
Law Review 25 (Summer 1973): 7s:n. -
8211Applicatiori of the Constitutional Privacy Right," 
p. 1042. 
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stitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court's decision, but preferred to base the right to pri-
vacy on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
rather than on the Ninth. 
The right to abortion, however, is not absolute, 
according to the Wade opinion, because 
it is reasonable and appropriate for a state 
to decide that at some point in time another 
interest, that of health of the mother or that 
of potential human life becomes significantly 
involved. The woman's privacy is no loneer 
sole and any right of privacy she possesses 
must be measured accordingly.BJ 
The Court for the first time, however, expressly held that 
infringements upon the right to privacy must be justified 
by a "compelling state interest." Before the point that 
·:the fetus is "viable"--that is, before the end of the 
! 
"first trimester.:.-the mother's protected right to privacy 
must be considered the dominant interest. 84 
Though·the Court, through Justice Blackmun, delivered 
its principle decision in Wade, the companion case, Bolton, 
followed that ruling. Whereas Wade challenged the validity 
of a Texas statute prohibiting abortion except.when neces-
sary to save the mother's life, Bolton challenged certain 
restrictive provisions of the Georgia abortion statute. 
D~claratory judgments and injunctions were sought on grounds 
_:·that the ~tatutes abridged the woman's right of personal 
privacy protected.by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
; ... ·Fourteenth ~.mendments. In Bolton, the Court held unconsti-
.. -'· 
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' tutional also the provision of the Georgia statute that 
prohibited abortions before the ending of the first tri-
~ester and.struck down other requirements of residency, 
~ospit~i-'accreditation, hospital committee approval, and 
concurrence of two other physicians. 85 
Some significant concurring thoughts in Wade 
that perhaps make the rationale of the Griswold, Wade, and 
Bolton decisions clearer were those of Justice Stewart, 
who had strongly dissented, along with Justice Black, in 
Griswold, and yet had concurred in Eisenstadt . 
I• 
••• it was clear to me then, and it is equally 
clear to me-now, that the Griswold decision can 
be'rationally understood only as a holding that 
the Connecticut statute substantively invaded 
the "liberty" that is protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...• As 
so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long 
line of cases decided under the doctrine of 
substantive due process, and I now accept it 
.as such .•.. The Constitution nowhere mentions 
a specific right of personal choice in matters 
,of marriage and family life, but the "liberty" 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment covers more than those free-
doms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights .... 
Clearly, therefore, the Court today is correct 
in holding that the right asserted by Jane Roe 
is .embraced.within the personal liberty pro-
'tected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. ~·86 
One.,observer of the 1972 term said that in Wade 
and Bolton, ''when. the. Cour.t. had its most dramatic oppor-
tunity_ to express its supposed aversion to substantive 
• ,t : ' 
due process, it carrie_d ~hat doctrine to lengths few 
· 
85Justices White a~d Rehnquist, who had dissented 
.in Wade, dissented aF:ain in ~oJ_to!'l, art!:uir:g that thg a1!or-
.tion issue~~hould.be left to the political processes of ~he 
·,:_state·. - -86". . .. ·. ' 
410.u.s. 113, 167-70. '. .. ··., 
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observers had expected .••• "·· In fact, this same observer 
riotes ·that Justice Rehnquist ·agrees in his dissent that 
the "liberty" protected by Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
c~s~ "embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of 
Rights," and Justice White would find abortions constitu-
tionally protected when required to avoid "substantial 
hazards to either life or health." Therefore, the Court 
could be "considered unanimous in accepting a fairly 
sweeping concept of substantive due process, although 
various justices continue to resist that characterization. 1187 
.. 
In summary, the Court decided that the abortion 
decision was a right of the individual that the govern-
ment could not abridge during the first trimester, since 
the woman's health was not at issue. The Court was not 
choosing simply between abortion ,mu: ~ and continued 
.pregnancy. It was not making a moral or religious deter-
mination. "It was instead choosing among alternative allo-
" • / ... ~· J 
cations of decision-making authority ..•. 1188 It decided 
that it was the role of the woman to make such a perso-
nal decision, rather than an agency of the government. 
·-, .. 
It was also the role of her doctor, and not the govern-
ment, to make the decision after the first trimester. The 
' • ·~ ~ i • • ~ ·,.: : 
. 
Court was not, in other words, .saying whether abortion is 
' 
moral~y.right.or wrong.- It did not consider the question. 
Instead, ·i~ d~cided that the question of abortion was 
within the ·~role .of the individual to decide for herself. 
: 37.... . .. .. ' . . .,.., ~ . --
. .· .Laurence~. l'r1ae, "~ore 1.•iord: J.owara a .•.odel of 
c''· Roles iri the. Due Process of Life and Law, " HC!-rvard Law 
··,Review '37 (November 1973): 2. 
88 .. ,'. 
: Ibid., p. 11. 
' ' 
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Whether or not the Court· recognized that it was involved 
in role-allocation in the abortion decisions, 
:it seems .clear that in seeking to weigh only 
the benefits and detriments of early abortion 
as such, the Court limited and clouded the hori-
zon of its inquiry by collapsing the considera-
tions bearing on the Abortion Decision Cwhich 
would involve an emotional and religious en-
tanglement of the state in determining the 
sanctity of life and the rights of the fetus 
as a person) into those involved in the abor-
tion decision [which required only that the 
·court transfer the role of decision-;.fJAker from 
the gove~nment to the woman herself J "99 
The significance of Wade and Bolton was that they 
reached beyond the marital relationship identified in 
Griswold by extending the right to choose abortion to 
the woman herself, married or unmarried. Of course, Eisen-
stadt had already made the extension of the choice to beget 
: to the unmarried woman. But the abortion cases also ex-
tended the Griswold right to include the decision to bear 
or abort. The abortion decisions, therefore, were an in-
cremental development in constitutional doctrine in the 
line of decislons from·~eyer through Eisenstadt. 90 
.When cases came before the Court in which public 
school teachers had been forced to resign after they had 
decided to bear, the Wade decision was obviously a deter-
mining' influence on the Court's decision. In Cleveland 
. 
Board of Education v. LaFleur and Cohen v. Chesterfield 
~ 89Ibld ~ , 51-2. : 
90 . 
. See, however, the argument that Wad~_was not an 
incremental development, but a "quantum jump" in Philip B. 
' Hevmann and ~Dou.glas E. 3arze1a~r, "The ?o!"est cu:.r1 the fT1re?s: 
··Roe v .. ',·[g_de a~d 2"ts Crit:cs," Bo::: ton Unive!"sit·.' ls:.'I Re·,'ie·.·1 
. 53. (July l973):. 777, n. 61. See also the argument that 'l'ia.Qg 
is· "bad· constitutional law" and is no part of the "privacy" 
interest_ the Bill of Rights suggests, in John Hart Ely, "The 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 'dade," Yale Law 
Journal 82 \April 1973): 920-49. -- ----
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·co. School Board, 94 s. Ct. 791 (1974), the Court invali-
dated the maternity leave regulations in upholding a free-
d.om ·Of personal choice in matters of marriage and family 
li_fe as a "liberty" protected by. the due process clause. 
Unconventional Sexual Conduct 
·The abortion decisions have also indicated that 
the Court is not adverse to using broad powers where neces-
. sary to protect ·fundamental privacy interests. This ex-
pansive use of judicial discretion was obvious in the 
Cleveland-Cohen cases, but has great potential in other 
areas of sexual conduct--those specifically considered 
"anti-social," "immoral," or "non-traditional" by society. 
If the Court follows the course of determining whether the 
state's interest in the protection of public morality or 
health justifies moral legislation or regulation, as it 
did in Vill~ge of Belle Terr~, then non-traditional living 
arrangements may be subject to close scrutiny since they 
' . 
involve "public" interests', Howeve~te in-
terests, which involve the StanJ.,gy right to privacy in 
" . 
the h~me ,---;~hasnomosexuali ty, extra~mari tal .relations, 
sod.omv •. a~d adui tery~--tlre-s-tate 's Interest may not be --
deermea-·compelling. enough to--justifyinvasfon of--=fnos-e--pri-
-----;· 
~-te---intimacies .------. ---· 
. · The cons ti tutionali ty of a public employer's right 
to require employees to comply with moral codes is one area 
where the. ~ncertainty of the right to .privacy is evident. 91 
. . 
----------------------
. 
9111Application of the Constitutional Privacy Right," 
· P•· 1062~ . . 
, . -~ . --. ' 
.·, 
.,• 
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One; reason that it has been difficult for a determination 
to be' made by courts in the area of moral· conduct laws, 
whether pertaining to public employees or citizens in 
general, is that courts are seldom faced with litigation 
involving private sexual behavior. Private, consensual 
sexual behavior is rarely prosecuted, and when charges 
are brought, they are generally in addition to charges of 
criminal activities for which authorities initially in-
vaded the citizen's privacy. 
Two recent district court cases, however, have 
given perceptive discussion of the right to privacy as 
applied to private sexual behavior. In Acanfora v. Board 
of Education, 359 F. Supp. t343 (D. Md., '1973), a homosexual 
! 
school teacher had been involuntarily transferred and even-
tually dismissed from employment. The district court, in 
' 
applying the rulings of Griswold and Wade, held for the 
first time that private consenting homosexuality is expli-
citly included within the zones of interests protected by 
the constitutional right to privacy. In Lovisi v. Slavton, 
363 F. Supp •. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), the Court was faced with 
a challenge to the conviction of a married couple and a 
third party for sodomy under Virginia law. Prosecution 
was precipitated when photographs taken by the partici-
' -~ 
pants in.the acts came into the possession of authorities . 
. ' 
The district judge accepted Wade's "candid approach:' to 
substantive due process and declared that the due process 
clause protect~ fundacental human values ''i~plicit in the 
, ; 
( .. concept of.ordered liberty." Since the broad Virginia 
94 
sodomy law would apply to private, marital acts, the court 
~·; . ' ~ 
, .. 
found that the law "doubtless threatens an invasion of the 
right of privacy." The court concluded that the marital-
non-marital distinction was no longer viabfe after Eisen-
stadt and therfore, the sodomy law could not be consti-
tutionally applied.to any private, consensual sexual be-
havior.92 
By broadening the definition of the right of pri-
vacy beyond previous limits, Wade does seem to mean that 
a wide variety of morality statutes abridge the privacy 
right. However, the Wade opinion can be seen to distin-
guish abortion laws from other morality laws since it indi-
cates that abortion laws were not fully established in the 
legal tradition of state regulatirin of personal matters.93 
Regulations of moral conduct, however, may "form a pattern 
.so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life 
that any constitutional doctrine in this area must build 
upon that basis. 1194 Wade, therefore, "leaves open the possi-
bility that such laws may be entitled to more respect and 
less severe scrutiny ... if they reflect the predominant 
. ' 1·.~-~o ra l view of society."95 
92363 F. S~pp. 620, 624-5.· The judge in Lovisi, ulti-
mately held that since petitioners had carelessly treated the 
"photographs of the acts, they forfeited an;r constitutional 
. ,protection and were therefore without standing to challenge 
''the law on privacy grounds. 363 F. Supp. 620, 629. 
' : = ~-~3410 u.s. llJ, 132-46. 
.. . :· 94Justice Harlan, concurring,· in Poe v. Ullman, 367 
' u:s. ·407 ·.· <46 ·(19h1) 
• • . ,,, t ..,I - ,,. -- • 
- . a~ 
,., .. , ..... .:'.:-'"The Supreme Court, 1972 Term," [iarvard law Review 
· 87 (November 197J): 84-5. 
···'"" 
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Physical Integrity and Other Autonomous Conduct 
From the rig~1t to autonomy in the abortion deci-
sion announced in Wade, one might draw a right to "invio-
l~bility of the body" and "physical integrity." However, 
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Wade, did say 
that the Court was not clear as to whether the claim that 
"one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one 
pleases 1196is related to the right of privacy articulated 
in Wade or in previous decisions. Thus, the question now 
is not "from whence did the right of privacy come?" but 
"where is it going and what are its bounds?" In Oliff v. 
East Side Union High School District, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972), 
cert. denied, the Court refused to hear the complaint 
-- . 
•raised against a school board's regulation of students' 
hairstyles as a violation of the First Amendment's guar-
antees of· freedom of expression. Although not addressing 
the First Amendment claim, Justice Douglas, dissenting, said 
that although" ••• 'liberty' is not defined in the Consti-
tution •.. as.we held in Griswold •.. it includes at least 
the fundamental rights 'retained by the people' under the 
Ninth Amendment."97 
.•·· .. The use of marijuana and other soft drugs may also 
be connected with other private rights involving autono-
mous conduct that does not affect others. To date, de-
tailed:inquiry into this area has not been made by the courts, 
and statutes are presumed to ce constitutional. 9g However, 
§'". 
96410 u.s. llJ, 154 . 
. _ .. 974'04 u.s. 1042, 1044. 
·---98 . 
.. '. ... "On Privacy, " p. 7 5 5. 
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it is important to note· that decisions such as Gris·Nold, Stan-
., -
lfill., Eisenstadt, and Wade, which have gone beyond the first 
"eight amendments in defining new riehts through the concept 
of "liberty," have opened the door for the Court to develop 
other unenumerated rights. 
Analysis of the Q.bi.fil[Q)Q Precedent Value 
and Radiating Effects 
Before making conclusions concerning the status 
of the privacy right and discussing one final area of pri-
vacy which has not been adequately .dealt with by the Court--
government gathering and use of personal information--a 
supplementary analysis will be made of the post-Griswold 
decisions. Although a prediction of what the Burger Court's 
;legac·y will be with regard to the privacy right is too soon 
at this stage, there have been, as the previous analysis 
indicates, a substantial number of indications of where the 
Griswold right stands now. Especially since Wade, the scope 
of "marital privacy" is at least recognizable. But Stanley 
and Katz also give valid indications of the total scope of 
the constitutional privacy right at the present time. By 
looking at the crucial and dramatic decisions of the Court 
since Griswold, the -future of the privacy doctrine cannot 
be. positively determined, of course. But the analysis in 
th~s chapter of the important privacy cases does show the 
overall influence of the right to privacy doctrine on subse-
quent .cases to ~ave been substantial. The precedent value 
of .the actual legal point involved in Griswold, the "penum-
' ., 
bral""derivation of a right to privacy, can be determined in 
97 
order to see its effect on subsequent cases of the Supreme 
Court and other federal courts. Through the use of Shepard's 
Citations99which comprehensively lists later citations of 
cases and classifies them by the legal point involved or 
precedent value, this determination can be made. Since 
Shepard's lists state court cases also, but does not classi-
fy them, the analysis here will be limited to the Supreme 
Court and other federal courts. 
CITATIONS OF GRISWOLD 3Y THE COURTS 
Controlling, Followed •.•. 
Distinguished••••••.•••••· 
·Limited ....•..••.•....... 
' ! 'Explained ••••• ~ ••••••.... 
Harmonized .••••••••.•••.. 
In Dissenting Opinion .••. 
Sample Cite .••••••••.•..• 
Total .......•... , ..... 
Supreme 
Court 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
27 
18 
Other 
Federal 
Courts 
8 
24 
1 
14 
1 
24 
47 
119 
Total 
8 
25 
1 
15 
1 
51 
65 
166 
From.this chart it is apparent that the majority, 
or 27 out of the 47 citations made of Griswold by the Su-
preme Court since 1965 have been in dissenting opinions. 
A check of those cases revealed also that 8 of those were 
.in dissenting opinions of Justice Black, where he was re-
ferring to his dissent in Griswold. The 20 other citations 
, ~ ,99shenard's United States Citations, Case Edition 
1943-19?1, vol. J (5th erl.., Co~orado Sprinr;s: Shcn3.rd 's 
C ·~ ti"ons Tnc lG?l)· r~~ 0 ~a·1-~io~ ~u~ 1 e~+ l07l-lG7~. 1 .... a ' -· ., ,1 • ~ :J u_ •. ._) .,u_er::._ .... , . - .... 1, 
Case Edi tton, vol. 73 (January 1974); "Advance Sheet·~ part 
!·(February 1974). 
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\vere. -two references to Griswold in Wade (one by the Court, 
_ distinguishing Griswold from 1.'/ade, and the othe·r in Justice 
' 
.Stewart's concurring opinion, explaining the Griswold case) 
and 18 sample citations of Griswold, where the case, decision, 
or any of the opinions were simply mentioned or referred to. 
In the case of the other federal courts, the pre-
cedent value of Griswold improves, with 8 cases citing it 
as being the controlling factor, while in 40 other cases 
Griswold was more than sample cited, but was distinguished, 
limited, explained, or harmonized. Its appearance in dis-
senting opinions of federal judges occurred 24 times, even 
less than in the Supreme Court. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis 
is that the Supreme Court and other federal courts have 
been slow to base decisions explicitly on the Gris0old right 
·to privacy. The Supreme Court has not cited Griswold as pre-
cedent, and the federal courts have a per-year-average of 
little over one citation of Griswold as precedent value. 
However, just as the foregoing discussion of the influence 
of Griswold was shown to have been more dramatic, so the ra-
diating effect of Griswold has obviously also been.strong 
since the federal courts have, in some· way, cited Griswold 
, on .. the average of 13. 2 times per year. 
With Wade, where the Court with greater unanimity. 
based the· right to abortion on the due process clause, the 
C,ourt_has obviously determined that the right to privacy is 
_implicit in the co:-icep-:; o: "order::d libert~:" rather "than in 
. - the "penumbras" of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. 
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·~hough the Griswold penumbral rieht to privacy was based 
too. vaguely in "emanations" from the "totality .of the Consti-
iution, ".the recognition of that right there led to con-
ti_nuing "probing and refinement" to determine from what pro-
visions that right is properly derived and what its dimen-
sions .are. Although the determination of legal point in-
volved. in dramatic cases such as Stanl_gy, Eisenstadt, and 
Wade cannot be ignored, the cumulative influence of Griswold 
on judicial opinion-formation "highlight(s] the tendency of 
doctrine. Where the law is heading is, we may speculate, as 
go~d or better a focus for decision for lower judges than 
black-letter parsing."lOO 
Conclusions 
Since Boyd in 1886, the Supreme Court.has made it 
clear that individual privacy is an interest that the Consti-
·tution protects through the Fourth Amendment. In decisions 
sin6e'then, the Court has held that in areas from tradi-
.. 
tional police searches to electronic eavesdropping, the right 
to privacy is so important that government, on invading it, 
mu~t·show a very "compelling" interest. 
Griswold has been the focal point for the develop-
ment of a constitutional right of privacy in areas other 
than· the Fourth Amendment. That decision established the 
constitutional right to privacy in terms much.broader than 
the traditional Fourth Amendment terms. However, it has 
been left to decisions since Griswold to more closely define 
that ~ight and to delineate its boundaries. The bounda~ies 
· .
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of Gris~old's specific privacy of the home, marriage, and 
family have been extended through Eisenstadt, Wade, and Cleve-
land - Cohen to include a woman's right, whether married or 
single, to determine, as Griswold also held, whether or not 
to beget or to bear children. 
The constitutional right to privacy has become visa-
bly separable into two branches since Grisw6ld: one, dealing 
with the secrecy of one's home and personal possessions, in-
eluding one's ideas and conduct, founded primarily in the 
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the self-incrimina-
tion clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the other dealing with 
the solitude of certain personal intimacies and the autonomy 
~1 personal decision-making, primarily founded in the "liber-
, 
ty" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
scope and implications of neither the first branch, involving 
secrecy of the home and possessions, nor the second, involving 
personal intimacies, have been fully developed by the Court. 
However, ~t appears that the constitutional right to privacy 
is focused on protecting an inner core of personal life against 
unjustified invasion by laws and rules of society) 
It is important also to see Griswold, Eisenstadt, 
Wade, and Stanley as part of a "rational continuum" of de-
cisions protecting rights other than those enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights. The right to privacy protected by these de-
cisions is a substantive, due process right. Altho~gh pri-
vacy protection after Griswold has been separated into two 
distinct areas for ~he nurnc~es o~ this stud~, i~ should ta 
emphasized that the Stanley decision makes the two areas of 
101 
"secrecy" and "solitude"-"autonomy" more easily associable 
under the general term "right to privacy." Where the Stan-
1.§..Y "right to privacy in the home" intersects with the Gris-
wold-Eisenstadt-Wade "right to privacy in sexual intimacies," 
there is an area common to both which suggests that privacy 
of sexual intimacies in the privacy of the home rates an es-
pecially high degree of protection. The fact that the S~an-
ley-Griswold-Eisenstadt-Wade decisions are all developments 
of a substantive, due process right unenumerated in the Bill)) 
of Rights may also be precedent for the development of other 
such rights. 
Since the focus of the right of privacy's develop-
ment has been on the relatively short period of the Warren 
and Eurger Courts, a comparison should be made of these 
Courts' progress in the development of a privacy right. The 
Warren Court had made rapid strides even before Griswold in 
developing a theory of privacy through First Amendment guar-
antees. In Berger and Katz it recognized that electronic 
surveillance had to be carefully supervised by the judiciary, 
and not left to determinations of administrative utility or 
efficiency by legislatures or law enforcement officers. 
Griswold and Stanlev, of course, were the Warren Court's 
primary bulwarks for privacy. Nevertheless, the period of 
the Warren Court ended before the effect of Griswold and 
Stanle'' was clear. 
The Burger Court can be dated from the seating of 
the third and fourth I:i:rnn ::.:~:;ointees, Lewis ? . Fo'.·12 .l l, .:·~. 
and William H. Rehnquist, in January 1972. In a short span 
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of' time that Court has given a surprisingly broad inter-
pretation in the area of rights associated with the Gris-
wold ~e.cision, primarily in Eisenstrrdt and \'lade. However, 
in cases following the Stanlev decision,· the Burger Court 
strictly limited the protection afforded to obscenity to 
the privacy of the home, and in the area of Fourth Amend-
ment privacy rights, the Court has remained rather restric-
tive. A recent study of the 3urger Court's record on pri-
vacy as of late-1973 said that the Burger Court 
{jl n its attempt to resolve the question concern-
ing a substantive definition of privacy, ..• 
has nrovided an odd mixture of activism and self-
restraint. The birth control case is clearly ac-
tivist ..• Likewise, the abortion decisions 
breathe of activism ...• Earlier, in the Wyman v. 
James decision, the Court had taken a much more 
restraintist position .. ,.101 
This apparent inconsistency of privacy protection on the 
Burger Court, the study proposes, is "consistent with a 
type of policy_making approach ... characterize(ct]as 
'active incrementalism. '" Furthermore, the study asserts 
that "with the exception of Douglas, there has been a con-
sistent lack of rationality in the development of a system 
. ~-· . . 102 
of' privacy. " 
· ·There is an area of privacy, however, with which 
iieither.the activist Warren Court nor the Burger Court has 
.adequately dealt. This is the very controversial area of 
government gathering and use of personal information, in-
cluding· financial records, arrest records, and other data 
. . · 
1011
.'filliam R. ':!:'ho::ias, "Shadow of l994: The .Surf:P-r 
Court and the En:.ersing .::::.ight of ?ri vac:v?" paper presented at 
the Southern Political Science Association, Sheraton-3iltmore 
Hotel, _·Atlanta, Ga., 1-3 November 1973, p. 27. 
·102. . 
Ibid. , p. 28 . 
. .'-. ~ , ' ·- ,. ". -
lOJ 
on millions of Americans. Although the Court has not de-
; ' 
fined the perimeters of privacy surroundi:ng the Stanlev and 
Wade decisions, perhaps the most important aspect of pri-
vacy which the Court has not protected is this area of 
personal information. Although it belongs most appropri-
ately in the area discussed earlier as "secrecy in the home 
and personal possessions, including conduct and ideas," it 
is dealt with here, in conclusion to this study because it 
portends so much for the future protection of the right to 
privacy. By upholding the constitutionality of the Bank 
Secrecy Act in California Ba~kers Assoct~~ion, 103the Court 
has indicated that government access to personal infor-
I 
mation concerning citizens is necessary to control ever-
.' > 
increasing crime in America. However, government accumu-
lation of information into computer dossiers has ranged 
further than the records of known criminals. 
Either by choice or by legal requirements, most 
government agencies are avid data collectors. For example, 
the Civil Service Commission maintains a "security file" 
in electrically powered rotary cabinets containing 2,120,000 
index cards. In its "security investigations index" the 
commission has 10,250,000 cards covering investigations 
since 1939. Still another file tabbed "investigative" con-
sists of.625,000 folders containing reports of current in-
vestigations. In addition, 2,100,000 earlier files are . 
'- ':' ,-~"' ": ~ 
held at.the Washington National Records Center. This is 
; . 
?~lv one agency. :n si~ilar fashion, data banks are m~in-
tained by the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Eureau 
lOJ 
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of Customs, Federal Bureau of Investieations, National Science 
Foundation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Pass-
port Office, Social ~ecurity Administration, and many more. 104 
To date, the primarv checks against abuse in informa-
tion-gathering have been bureaucratic self-restraint and ex-
posure by the press. Judicial relief has not been forthcom3.ng 
in this area. An anti-war activist who sought relief against 
.the Army's alleged surveillance of unlawful civilian political 
activity brought a class action suit to the Supreme Court in 
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 {1972). He claimed that the Army 
spying and accumulation of information on civilians had a 
"chilling effect 0 on their freedom of expression. The Court 
did not rule on the alleged invasion of privacy of expression 
and held that Tatum's claim was non-justiciable since he had 
suffered·no actual harm or "threat of specific future harm." 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing the Court's 
opinion, said that deciding the question brought by Tatum 
"would have the federal courts as virtually continuing moni-
tors of the wisdom and soundness of executive action." He 
said that role "is appropriate for the Congress acting 
through its committees and the 'power of the purse;' it is 
not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or im-
mediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful govern-
. ' 
mental action. 11105 
The realization in the sixties of the widespread 
surve~llan.ce and information-gathering activities of the FBI 
and Army Intelligence uni ts nressed Conf_"ress into stud:.'3-r.~ 
l054o8 u.s. 1, 14-15 {1972). 
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the problem, Uncovered by Congress and the press in 1970 
was the "CONUS" operation of the Army which monitored and 
compiled information on organizations and individuals en-
gaged in activities considered inimical to the national de-
fense interests. Individuals included U.S. Senator Adlai 
Steverison III, Representative Abner Mikva, Georgia State 
Representative Julian Bond, newsmen, university profes-
sors, and businessmen. Committees which held hearings on 
government surveillance and record-keepin~ activities and 
published their results and recommendations included the 
Senate .Subcommittee on Constitutional Ri~hts, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures, 
the House Subcommittee on Government Operations; and the 
House Special Committee on the Invasion of Priva~y. 106 
Despite the hearin~s and studies beginning in 1965, 
there is still no legislatively produced protection for the 
collection and dissemination of information by government 
agencies. More studies are underway. Both the Nixon Ad-
ministration and U.S. Senator Sam Erviri (D-N.C.) proposed 
bills to safeguard criminal records and intelligence in-
formation exchanged by law enforcement agencies. 107Also, 
four bills aimed at protecting financial records are being 
considered by both the ~ouse and the Senate. The bills 
generally p~opose that banks disclose financial records of 
their customers only when the customer has consented in 
1 • . -. lO~ John M. 0 'Brien, "!<ee-ping Track of Elected Of-
±'icials," :.in Ur.-::le Sa~ l;._."'.:~~l.:-2.t'.C_ ·-:: 11, p. 179. 
;.. lO?see l•~ark R. Arnold, "Administration Gives Big 
Boost to.a Privacy Bill," National Ob§erver 23 :<'ebruar:v 
1974, p. 2, :and William L. Shappley, Jr., "Branded: Arrest 
Records ·of the Unconvicted," ;,~ississi nni.. Law Journal 44 · 
(November 1973): 928. 
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writing, or upon an authorized subpoena or court order. 108 
The Nixon Administration has initiated more studies 
of privacy invasion in government procedures. A year-long 
HEW study on the protection of citizens' rights with re-
gard to computer compilations was made public in July 1973, 
giving broad recommendations. However, President Nixon, in 
his "Right to Pri vac;.r'' radio address of Februar~' 23, 1974, 
announced that he was establishing a Cabinet-level committee 
to do more studying of the privacy problem. 109 
The Supreme Court's prescriptive powers are limited 
when intrusion into personal privacy is caused by patterns 
of political and bureaucratic behavior. Respect for pri-
vacy in the area of personal information will undoubtedly 
have to come from congressional oversight of federal agen-
cies, and more importantly, from greater sensitivity of 
governmental officials to the threats to privacy. Perhaps 
a new federal agency designed to deal with safeguarding the 
110 government data banks would help. The role of the Court has 
been a vital one in bringing constitutional recognition to 
the privacy concern. The future of that role, however, with 
regards to protecting the privacy of personal information 
was expressed in 1966 and is just as relevant today: 
If Congress and governmental agencies develop a 
high degree of sensitivity to these. threats of 
dignity and privacy, the need for judicial inter-
108see Michael K. Guest, "Stark v. Connellv: Defining 
the Bank Customer's Right of Privacy," Indigng_Law Journal 48 
(Summer 1973):_ 649. 
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vention will decline, and if government becomes 
the model and preceptor of more decent behavior 
by those possessin~ power, it follows that pri-
vate institutions will either voluntarily assume 
a more responsible attitude toward those into 
whose live~ they intrude, or government, bv law, 
will compel greater respect for the privacies 
of life.111 
111William M. Beane~r, "The Gr_iswold Case and the 
Expanding Rieht to Privacy," Wisconsin law Review 1966 
(Fall ~966): 994-95. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Amendments to the U.S. ·constitution Relevant to 
The Sunreme Court's Develonment of a Right to Privacy 
Amendment One: "Congress shall ma'ke no law respecting an 
estahlishment of religion, or prohihiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," 
Amendment Three: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, 
nor in time of war, But in a manner to be prescribed by 
law." 
Amendment Fours "The rights of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
Amendment Five: "No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infanous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 5n 
actual service in time of War or publi.c danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." 
Amendment Nine: '~he enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed·to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
Amendment Fourteen, Section One: "All persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and.subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
an•r person of life, 11.br::!:'"t'', or "!":'rorert·.r, .. ,;_~>:0~Jt due -:c:.o-
cess of law; nor den~ to ~n·· ~r:r~o~ within it~ juri~dict~on 
the equal protection of the laws. 
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